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PREVENTIVE PRETRIAL DETENTION AND 
THE FAILURE OF INTEREST-BALANCING 
APPROACHES TO DUE PROCESS 
Albert W. Alschuler* 
We conclude that preventive detention under the [Family Court Act] 
serves a legitimate state objective . . . . 
- Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 
253, 256-57 (1984). 
[F]or the liberty of a man is highly valued in the law, and no man 
ought to be abridged of it, without some default in himself. 
- A. HIGHMORE, A DIGEST OF 
THE DOCTRINE OF BAIL viii 
(1783). 
INTRODUCTION 
The statements above, separated by two centuries, address the 
problem of preventive detention from different jurisprudential perspec-
tives. In Schall v. Martin, the Supreme Court upheld the preventive 
pretrial detention of juveniles accused of delinquent conduct. A cen-
tral dispute between the majority and the dissenting Justices appeared 
to be whether a "very important" or only a "legitimate" governmental 
interest was necessary to justify this deprivation of liberty. 
This article, echoing Highmore's treatise of 1783, maintains that 
neither a legitimate nor a very important governmental interest can 
justify preventive detention in the absence of significant proof of past 
wrongdoing or an inability to control one's behavior. Both the 
Supreme Court's neglect of this issue and Congress' similar neglect in 
the preventive detention provisions of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 
1984 reveal the extent to which cost-benefit analysis has captured 
American law and threatened core concepts of individual dignity. 
The article does not oppose all forms of preventive pretrial deten-
tion. To the contrary, it recognizes that the detention without bond of 
a person accused of crime can be consistent with Anglo-American 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
I am grateful to James P. Fleissner for research assistance; to Fleissner, Jeffery Chasnow, 
David P. Currie, Richard H. Helmholz, Ellen Hochstedler, John H. Langbein, John Monahan, 
Norval Morris, Stephen J. Schulhofer, and Geoffrey R. Stone for valuable suggestions; and to the 
Russell Baker Scholars Fund at the University of Chicago Law School for research support. 
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legal tradition, with fundamental fairness, and with sound policy. The 
article maintains, however, that the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 
is unconstitutional in failing to require adequate preliminary proof of 
guilt or convictability as a predicate for extended detention. The Act 
disregards concepts of individual freedom and responsibility that have 
dominated the law of pretrial detention from the time of Bracton. 
After describing the 1984 Act, the article offers a historical retro-
spective on due process adjudication. It emphasizes the differences be-
tween "fundamental fairness" and "interest-balancing" approaches to 
the due process clause. Turning specifically to Schall v. Martin, it ex-
amines the two-tiered interest-balancing formula employed in that 
case, a formula declaring that intrusions upon "fundamental" personal 
interests are consistent with due process so long as they sufficiently 
advance "compelling" governmental interests - and that restrictions 
of "nonfundamental" individual interests are constitutional when they 
adequately further "legitimate" governmental interests. The article 
contends that this familiar framework is deeply flawed. In some con-
texts, it is too activist; in others, too restrained. 1 
The article rejects several broad-gauged objections to all forms of 
preventive pretrial detention - their asserted dependency on an unat-
tainable ability to predict human behavior, their asserted incompatibil-
ity with the historic goals of pretrial detention, and their asserted 
departure from the presumption of innocence. The article also main-
tains that no persuasive constitutional challenge can be mounted to 
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (or, indeed, to substantially more intru-
sive preventive detention measures) under current interest-balancing 
due process formulas. 
Although the history of pretrial restraint in England and America 
offers no condemnation of all preventive pretrial detention, this history 
does reveal an unwavering condemnation of detention without bond in 
the absence of strong preliminary proof of guilt. This opposition re-
flected a deep-seated belief that responsible adults should be deprived 
of their liberty only when they had abused it. The Federal Bail Re-
form Act contravenes this principle - a principle of liberty "so rooted 
1. Interest balancing does have an appropriate role in some constitutional adjudication. For 
example, this article criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 
(1975), for its failure adequately to "balanc[e] the need for [a search or seizure] against the 
invasion of personal rights that [this intrusion] entails." See text at notes 241-46 infra. The 
fourth amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable" seizures should be read to demand a stronger 
factual showing to justify extended pretrial detention than to justify arrest. In some contexts, 
interest balancing may be appropriate in due process adjudication as well. See, e.g., International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This article contends, however, that the Supreme 
Court's current approach to the due process clause has tilted too far toward interest balancing 
and too far from historic concepts of individual freedom. 
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in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun-
damental. "2 For this reason, the Act violates the Constitution. 
I. THE FEDERAL BAIL REFORM Ac:r OF 1984 
In 1970, Congress authorized courts in the District of Columbia to 
detain some defendants without bond in order to protect the commu-
nity from crime, 3 but prosecutors rarely invoked the District of Co-
lumbia legislation.4 In federal courts outside the District, the right to 
bail in noncapital cases, established by the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789,5 persisted until 1984. The Bail Reform Act enacted that year6 
currently authorizes detention without bond when a case involves a 
crime of violence (defined broadly to include misdemeanor assault, tip-
ping over garbage cans, and possibly even shoplifting?), a crime pun-
2. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1986); see United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 
1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the stat-
ute by a divided vote). This legislation - one of the earliest legislative initiatives of the Nixon 
administration - was authored in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel. The authors of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 
1984 borrowed many of the Act's procedural provisions from the District of Columbia legisla-
tion. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983). 
To avoid an appearance of impropriety, Chief Justice Rehnquist might disqualify himself 
from participating in the decision of United States v. Salemo, No. 86-87 (cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 
397 (1986)), in which the Supreme Court may determine the constitutionality of the 1984 Act. 
Cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., not participating); Valid Doubts 
About Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1986, at A26, col. 1 (criticism of Justice Rehn-
quist for failing to disqualify himself in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), despite apparent 
participation in executive branch deliberations on issues that the case presented). 
A lawyer who has aided in drafting statutory language probably should not consider the 
constitutionality of that language in a judicial capacity (even when the language has been "laun-
dered" a bit by its inclusion in new legislation). Similarly, a lawyer who has acted as an advocate 
may think it inadvisable to sit in judgment on issues that he once addressed as a partisan. Pre-
ventive detention was an important legislative priority of the Nixon administration, and the As-
sistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel probably could not have viewed 
the issues posed by this legislation with detachment. 
4. See R.R. REP. No. 1419, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976) ("[F]rom date of enactment until 
[1976], pretrial detention was rarely requested (only about 60 times during the entire 5 year 
period)."); GEORGETOWN INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE & VERA INST. OP Jus-
TICE, PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 69 (1972) (referring to the 
"virtual non-use of the preventive detention law"). Unlike the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
see text at notes 14-15 infra, the District of Columbia statute did not restrict the use of money 
bond to accomplish sub rosa preventive detention. Prosecutors may have found it easier to re-
quest bail in amounts that defendants could not supply than to invoke the statute's more compli-
cated procedures. 
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. 
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (Supp. II 1984). 
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) (Supp. II 1984) (defining "crime of violence" to include "an 
offense that has as an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another"). The statute treats the use of force against 
property no differently from the use of force against a person; and if seizing a person is a crime of 
violence, perhaps larceny - seizing property - is a crime of violence as well. Courts may strain 
to avoid this jarring interpretation; but however narrowly they construe the statutory definition, 
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ishable by life imprisonment or death, a major drug offense, or a felony 
committed by a person previously convicted of two of the crimes listed 
above. 8 It also authorizes detention without bond when a case in-
volves "a serious risk that [the defendant] will flee" or that he will 
"obstruct ... justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate ... a prospec-
tive witness or juror."9 
Before ordering detention under the 1984 Act, a court must con-
duct a hearing at which the defendant "has the right to be represented 
by counsel, ... to testify, to present witnesses on his own behalf, to 
cross-examine witnesses ... , and to present information by proffer or 
otherwise."10 The Act provides that the rules of evidence shall not 
apply at the detention hearing. 11 Although it declares that "[t]he facts 
[used to support a detention order] shall be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence,"12 it indicates the gravity of the risk that a de-
fendant must pose to justify detention only by requiring a determina-
tion that no conditions of pretrial release will "reasonably" assure the 
safety of any other person and the community.13 When a prosecutor 
seeks detention on grounds of dangerousness, dangerousness is the 
only issue for the judge to resolve at the conclusion of the hearing. 
This article will contend that, because the Bail Reform Act fails to 
require substantial preliminary proof of a defendant's guilt, it is un-
constitutional. Nevertheless, before later sections of the article at-
the 1984 Act plainly uses the imposing term "crime of violence" to authorize the detention of 
defendants charged with minor offenses. When Congress permitted the denial of bail in noncapi-
tal cases, it apparently saw no reason to go half way. 
In United States v. Yeaple, 605 F. Supp. 85 (M.D. Pa. 1985), the court ordered the preventive 
detention of a defendant charged with the possession of child pornography. The prosecutor had 
concluded that this possession was a "crime of violence," and the court indicated that the prose-
cutor's determination might not be subject to judicial review. It added that in any event 
"[p]ersons who create the demand for [pornographic] material by ordering or purchasing it indi-
rectly cause minors to be drawn into this illegal activity, and bear some responsibility for the 
violence done to these minors, psychologically if not physically." 605 F. Supp. at 87. The court 
did not advert to the statutory definition, which requires the use or threatened use of physical 
force and apparently does not include the infliction of psychological harm. 
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(l) (Supp. II 1984). 
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) (Supp. II 1984). 
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. II 1984). Despite the Act's apparently unequivocal statement 
that defendants shall have the right to present witnesses, a United States Court of Appeals has 
held that trial judges may refuse to hear defense witnesses and may require defendants to proceed 
entirely by proffer. United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1395-96 (3d Cir. 1985). 
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. II 1984). 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. II 1984). 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. II 1984). Contrary to some descriptions of the statute, e.g., 
United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985); Government's Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at 4, United States v. Salerno, cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 397 (1986) (No. 86-87), the 
Bail Reform Act does not require clear and convincing evidence of "dangerousness." See Com-
ment, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 234 (1985). 
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tempt to bury the statute, a word of praise seems appropriate. This 
enactment drafted by the Reagan administration includes a provision 
that every civil libertarian ought to cheer: "The judicial officer may 
not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of 
the person."14 
Under this provision, no federal defendant may be imprisoned 
before trial because he is unable to post bond. The Act permits a 
judge to require financial security as a condition of release; but if a 
defendant proves unable to supply it, the judge must reconsider. After 
conducting a hearing, the judge may order the defendant's detention 
without bond; but if the evidence presented at the hearing fails to jus-
tify detention, the judge must release the defendant on conditions that 
do not require the posting of financial security. 15 
This scheme does not eliminate the advantage that the bail system 
affords the rich in the administration of criminal justice16 but does 
reduce it. 17 This article will argue that when a responsible adult has 
done nothing wrong his apparent dangerousness is not an appropriate 
basis for detention. Dangerousness, however, is a more appropriate 
basis for detention than poverty. Under the federal statute, an organ-
ized crime figure who has repeatedly resorted to violence but who is 
able to post bail no longer will be allowed to go free while a defendant 
charged with writing a bad check is kept in custody because he is too 
poor to hire a surety. The Act moves the federal courts toward the 
pattern of pretrial release and detention found in European nations, 18 
a development that does not seem regrettable. 
In some federal districts, prosecutors and judges appear to have 
disregarded the Act's prohibition of detention for failure to post 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (Supp. II 1984). 
15. Under provisions that the 1984 Act carried forward from the Bail Reform Act of 1966, a 
federal judge ordinarily may not require financial security as a condition of release unless a de· 
fendant seems unlikely to appear if released on nonfinancial conditions. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(c)(2) (Supp. II 1984). When a judge requires financial security under this standard and 
the defendant is unable to supply it, the judge is very likely to order detention on the ground that 
release would create a "serious risk" of flight. Nevertheless, the bond requirement becomes un· 
lawful when the defendant proves unable to satisfy it. Although the standard that the judge must 
apply after a detention hearing does not differ substantially from the standard applicable to his 
earlier decision to require a bond, the Act demands a sober second look. 
16. As indicated, a defendant may find himself the subject of a detention hearing only be· 
cause he cannot provide financial security. 
17. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE AD· 
MINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 58-82 (1963) [hereinafter ALLEN REPORT] (nr· 
guing for reform of the bail system to promote greater equality between the rich and the poor). 
18. See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I. 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963 
(1965) ("In some European countries, bail is either not authorized, as in Sweden, where it is 
'considered to lead to inequality before the law,' or, although provided for by law, has fallen into 
disuse, as for example, in Norway, Denmark, West Germany.") (footnote omitted). 
December 1986] Preventive Detention 515 
bond.19 Only in these districts, however, may the Act be largely a 
dead letter like its District of Columbia precursor.20 A March 1986 
issue of the National Law Journal reported differing claims concerning 
the frequency of detention hearings under the Act, but every claim 
suggested that use of the new procedures had become common. The 
Justice Department reported that, during the first sixteen months that 
detention without bond had been available, it had sought detention in 
2853 cases. It also reported that judges had ordered detention in 
eighty percent of the cases in which the Department had requested it. 
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts offered a much 
higher figure - 4178 hearings during a five-month period in 1985. 
This figure indicated that judges might have conducted detention hear-
ings in as many as twenty-five percent of all federal felony cases. The 
United States Marshals Service claimed that the 1984 Act had been 
"primarily responsible for a 32 percent increase in prisoner population 
... during the first year after its passage."21 
Congress may not have anticipated the extent to which its action 
would augment the number of defendants imprisoned without trial. 
When the Senate Judiciary Committee reported the proposed 1984 
Act to the Senate, it declared: 
[T]he Committee concluded that . . . there is a small but identifiable 
group of particularly dangerous defendants as to whom neither the im-
position of stringent release conditions nor the prospect of revocation of 
release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or other per-
sons. It is with respect to this limited group of offenders that the courts 
must be given the power to deny release pending trial.22 
Among the disturbing aspects of the 1984 Act are some things that 
are not there. Unlike the 1970 preventive detention legislation for the 
District of Columbia, which in most cases limited the period of pre-
trial incarceration to sixty days,23 the 1984 Act imposes no limit on 
the length of pretrial detention. Its authors relied on a measure en-
acted after the District of Columbia statute, the Federal Speedy Trial 
19. See Riley, Preventive Detention Use Grows-But Is It Fair?, Natl. L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 
1, 32 (James I.K. Knapp, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General, reported that "as many as 7 
percent to 8 percent of all federal felony defendants may still be detained on high bails ... and 
that resistance to using the new detention procedures in places, like the Southern District of 
Florida, has Jed to disagreements between U.S. attorneys and the Justice Department in 
Washington."). 
20. For one possible explanation of the different effects of the two statutes, see note 4 supra. 
21. Riley, supra note 19, at 32. 
22. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1983). This indication of legislative purpose 
underlines the need for judicial clarification of the Act's imprecise standard of dangerousness. 
See note 162 infra. 
23. D.C. CODE ANN.§ 23-1322(d) (1981) (limiting pretrial detention to 60 days but permit-
ting a single extension of no more than 30 days for "good cause shown"). 
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Act of 1974,24 to guard against prolonged imprisonment before trial. 
The 1974 Act provides, but only as a starting point, that the trial 
of an incarcerated defendant must begin within ninety days of his de-
tention. 25 Although Senator Thurmond, Senator Laxalt, and others 
who supported the 1984 Act described this ninety-day period as an 
"upper bound" or "worst case limit,"26 they were in error.27 The au-
thors of the Speedy Trial Act recognized that the circumstances justi-
fying delay cannot be reduced to a formula. After providing other, 
more specific exclusions from the ninety-day period, they created an 
all-purpose escape route. The Act authorizes judges to extend the 
ninety-day period on the basis of findings that "the ends of justice 
served by [granting continuances] outweigh the best interest of the 
public and the defendant in a speedy trial."28 Statistics compiled by 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts indicate that 
most federal criminal cases are not concluded within periods close to 
the base periods established by the Act.29 Indeed, in a complex case, 
federal pretrial detention can easily last longer than a year. 30 
24. 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-3174 (1982). 
25. 18 u.s.c. § 3164(b) (1982). 
26. 130 CONG. REc. S941 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); id. at S943 
(statement of Sen. Laxalt); id. at S945 (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
27. So was the Senate Judiciary Committee, which recognized that the 90-day period was 
"subject to certain periods of excludable delay" but nevertheless contended that it would "assure 
that a person is not detained pending trial for an extended period of time." S. REP. No. 225, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 n.63 (1983). 
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1982). 
29. Under the Speedy Trial Act, the base period for commencing a federal criminal trial is 
ordinarily 70 days from the filing of an indictment or information. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(l) 
(1982). The Administrative Office does not compile figures on the median time from filing to the 
beginning of trial, but it does publish figures on the median time from filing to disposition. In 
fiscal 1985, this median period for all criminal cases - including a large number of traffic cases 
as well as cases resolved by dismissals and guilty pleas rather than trials - was 3.0 months. 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 181-82 (also 
reporting without explanation figures for fiscal 1984 that differ greatly from those reported by the 
1984 Annual Report - a circumstance that may suggest some lack of reliability of Administra· 
tive Office statistics). 
30. In United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986), the court noted that 
the defendants' preventive pretrial detention had lasted for more than eight months with no 
impending trial on the horizon. Although the defendants had been imprisoned since August 
1985 - some in secure facilities in which they remained locked in their cells 23 hours a day -
their lawyers estimated that their trial would not begin before mid-1987, almost two years after 
the detention had begun. The government's lawyers questioned this estimate but offered no esti· 
mate of their own. See also Bridges, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal 
Criminal Litigation. 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY so, 69 (1982) (despite the Speedy Trial Act, 
approximately 10 percent of all federal criminal cases required more than 360 days of "proces-
sing time"). 
Chief Judge Feinberg dissented in United States v. Salemo, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cert. 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986), in which the Second Circuit held the 1984 Act unconstitutional. 
Judge Feinberg maintained, however, that preventive detention would become punitive and 
would violate the due process clause when it lasted too long. This analysis led him to join the 
Second Circuit's holding that the detention in Melendez-Carrion was invalid. The Seventh Cir· 
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As commentators have often noted, the burdens of pretrial impris-
onment are not limited to losses of time and liberty. The jobs of de-
tained defendants frequently disappear, and friendships and family 
relationships are disrupted. 3 I Indeed, families and friends sometimes 
lose interest and no longer visit or write. The physical conditions of 
confinement often are worse for untried defendants, frequently de-
tained in local jails, than for convicted felons detained in penitentia-
ries. 32 Work opportunities and educational programs usually are less 
available. 33 Coercion to engage in homosexual activities appears to be 
common as do other forms of brutalization, and suicide rates are 
high. 34 Moreover, incarceration affects a defendant's physical appear-
ance and impedes his ability to consult lawyers, locate witnesses, and 
otherwise prepare a defense. 35 The available empirical studies of the 
effects of detention may not be conclusive, for perfect controls are un-
attainable. Nevertheless, these studies strongly suggest that pretrial in-
carceration makes both conviction and a severe sentence more likely.36 
One might imagine that, before imposing these burdens, a civilized 
cuit and the Third Circuit have taken a view like Judge Feinberg's - sustaining the constitution-
ality of the Act but suggesting that lengthy preventive pretrial detention would violate the due 
process clause. See United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 387-88 (3d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 
780, 785 (E.D.N.Y.) (Weinstein, C.J.) ("A substantial ... basis for my decision to confirm the 
Magistrate's decision to release the defendant is that the necessary delay in bringing the case to 
trial will require him to be incarcerated from 13 months to two years . . • . Such a long period of 
preventive detention without a finding of guilt ... is 'anathema to American ideals of due pro-
cess.' "), revd., 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985). 
Judge Feinberg's argument that preventive detention would become punitive after the passage 
of time seems difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's motive-based definition of punish-
ment. See notes 85-86 infra and accompanying text. His position also would create a difficult-to-
administer system of pretrial detention. Unlike Judge Weinstein in United States v. Colombo, 
supra, Judge Feinberg would not order release when lengthy detention seemed likely at the out-
set. Instead, he would wait until this detention became "punitive" before declaring it unconstitu-
tional. For this reason, the effective representation of a detained defendant apparently would 
require his lawyer to appear before a judge at periodic intervals to ask, "Now?" After an unspec-
ified number of months during which the judge would reply, "Not yet," he would answer, "Yes, 
now.'' Judge Feinberg suggested that the moment of magic metamorphosis would vary from one 
case to the next. Just when the preventive tadpole would become a punitive bullfrog seems to be 
anyone's guess. 
31. See R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM 41 (1965); D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED 
STATES 43 (1964); STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 3 (Approved Draft 1968) 
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. 
32. See ALLEN REPORT, supra note 17, at 73; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 31, at 41-43; D. 
FREED & P. WALD, supra note 31, at 44; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 31, at 2-3. 
33. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 31, at 43. 
34. See R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETTO 6, 18-19, 105-12 (1975). 
35. See ALLEN REPORT, supra note 17, at 74-76; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 31, at 40-43 
(1965); D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 31, at 45-46. 
36. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 31, at 3; D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 31, at 46-
48; Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-trial 
Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 84-86 (1963); Konecni & Ebbesen, External Validity of Research 
in Legal Psychology, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 60 (1979); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Deten-
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society would demand substantial preliminary evidence that a defen-
dant had committed a crime. One might imagine as well that this 
society would afford the defendant at least an informal hearing on the 
issue. The United States, however, does not do so. The Bail Reform 
Act requires no finding of probable guilt or convictability as a prereq-
uisite to detention. Indeed, in most federal cases, only an ex parte, in 
camera determination of probable cause by a grand jury (a body often 
dominated by a federal prosecutor37) guards against preventive incar-
ceration of the innocent. 
In a system of preventive detention in which dangerousness alone 
could justify detention, 38 guilt would be merely evidence. ·Lacking in-
dependent moral significance, past wrongdoing would be merely one 
indicator of dangerousness among many. The Bail Reform Act ap-
pears to treat guilt in this fashion. It offers a lengthy list of "factors to 
be considered" in determining "whether there are conditions of release 
that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required 
and the safety of any other person and the community." On this list 
(treated no differently from "the history and characteristics of the per-
son, including . . . his character, physical and mental condition") is 
"the weight of the evidence against the person."39 The absence of a 
single statutory factor (like proof of past misconduct) apparently does 
not preclude detention. 
Congress' failure to require prosecutors to offer preliminary proof 
of guilt at detention hearings was deliberate. The earlier preventive 
detention legislation for the District of Columbia had allowed deten-
tion only when, at the conclusion of an adversary hearing, a trial judge 
had found a "substantial probability" that the defendant had commit-
ted the offense charged. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
had construed this requirement to establish a standard "higher than 
probable cause" - one "equivalent to the standard required 'to secure 
a civil injunction.' "40 In testimony before Congress, however, Justice 
Department lawyers noted "practical problems entailed in coming for-
ward with additional evidence necessary to meet this standard."41 
tion, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641, 655 (1964). But see J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED 
185-211 (1979). 
37. See text at notes 214-15 infra. 
38. See text at notes 106-20 infra. 
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (Supp. II 1984). 
40. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1339 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 
(1982) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 907, 9lst Cong., 2~ Sess. 182 (1970)). 
41. Bail Reform: Hearings on S. 440, S. 482, S. 1253, S. 1554 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1981) (statement of 
Deputy Associate Attorney General Jeffrey Harris); see also id. at 189-91; S. REP. No. 225, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1983). 
December 1986] Preventive Detention 519 
These lawyers advocated legislation that would empower the federal 
courts to imprison untried defendants on the basis of less evidence 
than they would require before issuing preliminary injunctions in civil 
cases. The Senate Judiciary Committee was persuaded. Citing the 
Justice Department's objections, it declared: "For good reason the bill 
does not incorporate, as a precondition of pretrial detention, a finding 
that there is a 'substantial probability' that the defendant committed 
the offense for which he is charged."42 
42. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 18. Especially in light of the fact that the 1984 Act 
declares the rules of evidence inapplicable to pretrial detention hearings, the Justice Depart-
ment's objections to presenting preliminary proof of guilt appear insubstantial. In proceedings 
under the Act, the Department often has presented hearsay evidence of acts of violence that did 
not lead to prosecution, and prosecutors should be able to present at least as much evidence of 
the offenses that they have charged. Unless the Government in fact has filed charges without 
substantial evidentiary support, it should be able to offer a detailed hearsay description of its 
evidence (if not more); and a court should be able to hear and consider whatever evidence a 
defendant may offer in rebuttal at the early stage at which a detention hearing occurs. See State 
v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 374-78, 164 A.2d 740, 744-46 (1960). 
Indeed, in the absence of this requirement, the 1984 Act could be abused by prosecutors who 
believe that they know much more than they can prove. For example, a zealous prosecutor 
might be unable to establish the guilt of a reputed organized crime figure although organized 
crime "intelligence" suggests that this person has participated in numerous crimes. After per-
suading a grand jury to indict this person for a racketeering offense, the prosecutor might seek 
his detention and might present the hearsay testimony oflaw enforcement agents concerning the 
allegations that underworld informants have made about him in exchange for government favors. 
If the defendant then were acquitted after a period of detention grounded on this hearsay, the 
prosecutor might wait, file new charges, and begin the process again. In this way, the 1984 Act 
could become an important weapon in the war on organized crime, a device for incarcerating 
well-known "sleazes" whom it would be difficult or impossible to convict of crime. 
I do not suggest that federal prosecutors have misused the statute in this fashion. The games-
manship that influences organized crime prosecutions, however, is suggested by the caption that 
the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York provided for what 
may become a landmark case - the case in which the Supreme Court is likely to address the 
constitutionality of the 1984 Act. This sort of caption appears routine in "organized crime" 
prosecutions: 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
ANTHONY SALERNO, a/k/a "Fat Tony," 
VINCENT CAFARO, a/k/a/ "Fish," 
VINCENT DI NAPOLI, a/k/a "Vinnie," 
LOUIS DI NAPOLI, a/k/a "Louie," 
GIUSEPPE SABATO, a/k/a/ "Pepe," 
CARMINE DELLA CAVA, a/k/a "Carmine,'' 
THOMAS CAFARO, a/k/a "Tommy,'' 
JOHN TRONOLONE, a/k/a "Peanuts," 
MILTON ROCKMAN, a/k/a "Maishe,'' 
NICHOLAS AULETTA, a/k/a "Nick," 
EDWARD J. HALLORAN, a/k/a "Biff,'' 
ALVIN 0. CHATTIN, a/k/a "Al," 
RICHARD COSTA, a/k/a "Richie," 
ALPHONSE MOSCA, a/k/a "Funzi,'' and 
NEIL MIGLIORE, a/k/a "Neil,'' DEFENDANTS 
United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y.), revd., 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cerL 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986). Perhaps the defendants' "aliases" were included in the caption 
solely to aid in identifying them, but prosecutors may have had less attractive reasons. If so, one 
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In 1985 and 1986, the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit and the Seventh Circuit sustained the 1984 Act's consti-
tutionality,43 but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the 
Act unconstitutional.44 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in 
the Second Circuit case and is likely to determine the Act's constitu-
tionality during its current Term.45 
II. DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 
A. Utilitarianism, Natural Justice, and Due Process of Law 
1. A Short History of Due Process Adjudication 
Although the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments are identical,46 due process adjudication essentially began 
wonders whether their tactics will prove effective with the Justices of the Supreme Court, includ-
ing ANTONIN SCALIA, a/k/a "Nino," and BYRON WHITE, a/k/a "Whizzer." 
43. See United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986); 
United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 
(7th Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit upheld the 1984 Act only after construing it to save its 
constitutionality. For one thing, the court held that, to prevent the statute from violating the 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a defendant must be afforded use immunity 
for testimony at a pretrial detention hearing. See Perry, 788 F.2d at 115-16. More importantly, 
the court noted that the Constitution affords the federal government no power to promote the 
general welfare, no power to enact general civil commitment statutes, and no power to detain a 
defendant simply on grounds of undifferentiated dangerousness. Only the danger that a def en· 
dant would commit a federal crime or otherwise interfere with a federally protected interest 
could support his pretrial detention; and despite the unqualified language of the statute, the court 
construed it to require proof of this sort of "federally cognizable" dangerousness. 788 F.2d at 
109-11. 
The Third Circuit's analysis suggests that the preventive detention that the Supreme Court 
currently is considering in United States v. Salemo may be unconstitutional. The district court 
concluded in Salemo that "the government has ... demonstrated that Cafaro has directed vio-
lent acts and is ready, willing and able to direct violent acts in the future." Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 
at 1374. Similarly, it observed: 
The government has proffered information showing that Salerno could order a murder 
merely by voicing his assent with the single word "hit." Although some of these murder 
conspiracies occurred between six and ten years ago, their seriousness and the ease with 
which they could be ordered weigh heavily in favor of finding that Salerno is a present 
danger to the community. 
631 F. Supp. at 1371. 
The court did not demonstrate that the violent acts attributed to Cafaro or the murder con-
spiracies attributed to Salerno could have been the subjects of federal prosecution. The protec-
tion of the community against murder and other violent crimes is ordinarily the province of the 
states. Why the pendency of a federal charge should itself confer a federal power to prevent a 
defendant's commission of state crimes is unclear. 
44. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986). In an 
opinion by Judge Kearse that drew extensively upon an earlier opinion by Judge Newman, the 
Second Circuit advanced an old-style, nonutilitarian interpretation of the due process clause like 
the one that this article will advance. The court, however, held all forms of preventive pretrial 
incarceration unconstitutional, a position that this article rejects. 
45. United States v. Salerno, No. 86-87 (cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986)). 
46. The Supreme Court has declared that the two clauses, although adopted in different his-
torical contexts, have the same meaning. See Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903); Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977). 
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with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.47 The Supreme 
Court earlier had interpreted the phrase "due process of law" to refer 
to traditional English procedural law - "those settled usages and 
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of Eng-
land, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not 
to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having 
been acted on by them after the settlement of this country."48 Impos-
ing upon the states every detail of established English procedure, how-
ever, would have subverted basic principles of federalism without 
furthering the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. In 1884, in one 
of its earliest significant interpretations of the post-Civil War clause, 
the Court asserted a power to determine which portions of traditional 
law the provision embodied. In Hurtado v. California, 49 the Court 
spoke of "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie 
at the base of all our civil and political institutions."50 
The Court repeated this language in 1932 when it held in Powell v. 
Alabama 51 that a trial court's denial of counsel to defendants in a cap-
ital case had contravened the "immutable principles of justice which 
inhere in the very idea of free government."52 The Court referred once 
47. The Supreme Court commented on this phenomenon in 1877: 
It is not a little remarkable, that while [the due process clause] has been in the Constitu-
tion of the United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the Federal government, for 
nearly a century, and while, during all that time, the manner in which the powers of that 
government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most 
rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been 
invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theatre of public discussion. But while it 
has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the power of the States, only a very 
few years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that 
State courts and State legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law. 
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1877). Although the framers of the fourteenth 
amendment almost certainly did not intend to vary the meaning of the fifth amendment's due 
process clause, they may not have had much knowledge of the history of this clause or of its 
judicial interpretation. They may have regarded the open-ended language of the clause simply as 
a mandate for just and regularized procedure. In these circumstances, courts might have inter-
preted both the fifth and the fourteenth amendments' due process clauses in light of the four-
teenth amendment's general objective of reconstructing the South and ensuring the just 
treatment of black (and other) Americans. 
48. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1855). 
49. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
50. 110 U.S. at 535. 
51. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
52. 287 U.S. at 71 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)); see also 287 U.S. at 
67 (attributing the earlier language about "fundamental principles of liberty and justice" to 
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926), one of several cases repeating this language). 
Powell's interpretation of the due process clause was significantly more expansive thanHurtado's. 
Hurtado, without departing from the view that the due process clause referred to established 
English procedural law, had limited the scope of the clause to aspects of traditional law that 
courts regarded as "fundamental." In contrast, Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell recog-
nized that no departure from "the settled usages and modes of proceeding under the common 
and statute law of England before the Declaration of Independence" had occurred in the case 
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more to the "fundamental principles ... at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions" when it ruled in 1936 in Brown v. Mississippi that 
the use of brutally coerced confessions was "revolting to the sense of 
justice."53 
For practical purposes, as Francis Allen has observed, the Court's 
use of the due process clause to supervise state criminal procedure be-
gan during the decade that totalitarian regimes were emerging in west-
ern Europe. 54 European dictatorships, in Allen's words, were using 
"the institutions of criminal justice as instrumentalities for the system-
atic destruction of political values upon which free societies rest";55 
and although the Supreme Court had not reversed a state conviction 
on the authority of the due process clause until almost sixty years after 
the ratification of the fourteenth amendment,56 the Court long had 
read the due process clause to embody these core values. 
The view of due process advanced in Hurtado v. California, Powell 
v. Alabama, and Brown v. Mississippi had a "natural law" bent. It 
echoed Coke's interpretation of the phrase ''per legem terrae" of 
Magna Charta.57 The Court's view was tolerant of diversity and ex-
perimentation but insisted that law must adhere at its core to immuta-
ble principles of human dignity. The due process clause empowered 
the judiciary to articulate these principles and to treat legislation that 
offended them as unconstitutional. At the same time, decisions ad-
monished against reliance on a purely personal intuition in the articu-
before the Court. 287 U.S. at 65. Powell, however, did not assert a judicial power to disregard 
traditional law in determining what principles of justice the due process clause embodied. In-
stead, the Powell opinion offered a detailed history of the right to counsel in England and 
America, concluding that American jurisdictions had consistently rejected the English common-
law rule. 287 U.S. at 60-65. The opinion also noted that in a capital case "[t]he United States ••• 
and every state in the Union ... make it the duty of the trial judge, where the accused is unable 
to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him." 287 U.S. at 73. 
53. 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). As it had in Powell, the Court attributed the language about 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice to Hebert v. Louisiana. 
54. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 522. Although many people know that Allen was dean of the University 
of Michigan Law School, few know that he also founded a prominent academic movement - the 
Aurora, Illinois, school of criminal justice. Three teachers of criminal law at American law 
schools (Allen himself, Phillip Johnson of the University of California at Berkeley, and I) learned 
most of what we needed to know about crime in the public schools of this small prairie metropo-
lis. Allen is no longer dean at Michigan, but he will be capo of the Aurora school of criminal 
justice forever. Cf Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (unconstitutional to frisk the patrons of 
an Aurora tavern before executing a warrant to search the tavern for narcotics - majority of the 
Supreme Court had never been to Aurora). 
55. Allen, supra note 54, !It 522. 
56. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); see also Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) 
(ordering a hearing on a state prisoner's claim that a mob-dominated trial had deprived him of 
due process of law). 
57. See 1 E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*50-51; Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.). 
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lation of core values. Judges were to act primarily as armchair 
historians and sociologists. The issue was not only whether a chal-
lenged practice "shock[ ed] the conscience"58 but also whether it "of-
fend[ ed] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."59 
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court reviewed state substantive legislation more vigorously than it 
reviewed state procedural enactments. 60 Despite the fourteenth 
amendment's reference to "process," Lochner v. New York 61 and other 
decisions invalidating state economic legislation departed from the re-
strained, tradition-based interpretation of the amendment articulated 
in Hurtado and other procedural decisions. The Court's "substantive 
due process" opinions declared that all substantive regulation must be 
justified as an exercise of something called the police power. Under 
this view, restrictions of liberty were not unconstitutional only when 
they were bad or very bad (conscience-shocking or incompatible with 
fundamental principles of liberty); they were unconstitutional unless 
they were good. The Court demanded affirmative justification for 
every restriction of liberty. What the Supreme Court called justifica-
tion under the police power was no different from what it later would 
call a "rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest."62 
As the Court wrote in Lochner, "The act must have a ... direct rela-
tion, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and 
legitimate .... "63 The Court's departure from the restraint inherent 
·in more tradition-based standards prompted Justice Holmes' dissent: 
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted 
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, 
unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit 
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they 
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law. It 
does not need research to show that no such sweeping condemnation can 
be passed upon the statute before us. 64 
58. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
59. E.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (citations omitted). 
60. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication -A Survey and Criti-
cism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 325 (1957). 
61. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
62. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973). 
63. 198 U.S. at 57. 
64. 198 U.S. at 76. Holmes' tradition-based dissent may appear ironic in view of his contri-
bution to a largely ahistorical utilitarian jurisprudence, but it was consistent with his view that 
courts ought rarely interfere with the utilitarian tinkering and power-brokering of legislatures. 
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2. Current Approaches to the Due Process Clause 
The fourteenth amendment's protection of life, liberty, and prop-
erty echoed the language of the Declaration of Independence, but the 
twentieth century has seen a decline in the faith in natural justice that 
sparked the Declaration. 65 In fourteenth amendment adjudication, in-
terest balancing and the "incorporation" of Bill of Rights safeguards 
have largely supplanted the Supreme Court's "fundamental fairness" 
interpretation of the due process clause. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 66 the 
Court recognized that its incorporation of Bill of Rights provisions 
had reflected the partial abandonment of an earlier search for tran-
scendent principles of ordered liberty. 67 Moreover, in cases in which 
Bill of Rights provisions are inapplicable, the Court has adopted an 
open-ended utilitarian approach to "procedural" due process, one that 
affords only limited deference to procedures approved by the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government: 
[l]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
nally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail. 68 
Although "substantive" due process adjudication entered a dor-
mant phase in 1937, 69 this branch of fourteenth amendment litigation 
reemerged in 1965. The decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 70 how-
ever, did not resurrect the "police power" or "legitimate governmental 
65. For descriptions of the original faith, see B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OP 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55-93, 175-98 (1967); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of 
American Constitutional Law (pts. 1 & 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-29); see also Grant, 
The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 56 (1931). For a brief exami-
nation of where the loss of this faith has led, see Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on 
the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436 (1987). 
66. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
67. [R]ecent cases applying provisions of the first eight Amendments to the States repre-
sent a new approach to the "incorporation" debate. • . . Of each of these determinations that 
a constitutional provision originally written to bind the Federal Government should bind 
the States as well it might be said that the limitation in question is not necessarily fundamen-
tal to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but is fundamental in the 
context of the criminal processes maintained by the American States. 
391 U.S. at 149 n.14. For the view that "selective incorporation" has yielded an overprocedural-
ized criminal justice system that subverts through plea bargaining the most basic of due process 
rights, the right to be heard, see Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to 
Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, SOU. CHI. L. REV. 931, 995-1011 (1983). 
68. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
69. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
70. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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interest" analysis of Lochner. Courts can apply "fundamental fair-
ness" and "interest-balancing" interpretations to "substantive" and 
"procedural" due process issues interchangeably;71 and Griswold at-
tempted, perhaps inartfully, to ground the right to marital privacy 
upon legal tradition (penumbras, formed by emanations of various 
constitutional guarantees) and upon natural law: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older 
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a 
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and inti-
mate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a 
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilat-
eral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association 
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. 72 
In 1973, however, the Court articulated a concept of substantive 
due process more reminiscent of Lochner. It declared that a govern-
mental restriction of liberty would be unconstitutional unless this re-
striction advanced a "legitimate" governmental interest. Indeed, the 
Court went beyond Lochner by declaring that a "legitimate" objective 
was not always good enough. The Court wrote in Roe v. Wade: 
"Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held 
that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compel-
ling state interest.' " 73 The Court concluded that its invalidation of 
71. Although the fourteenth amendment speaks only of "process," efforts to confine the due 
process clause to procedural issues are likely to yield incongruous results. That a police officer 
may not adjudicate guilt and send a person to prison on the basis of personal intuition is a 
procedural protection of limited value if a state may make it a substantive crime to "give offense 
to a police officer." Moreover, a due process clause confined entirely to procedural matters 
would afford no protection against restrictions of the right to speak and other "substantive" 
freedoms generally regarded as essential to ordered liberty. 
72. 381 U.S. at 486. 
73. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). The cases that the Supreme Court cited in support of its two-
tiered interest analysis under the due process clause had not arisen under that clause. Most were 
equal protection decisions in which the Court had said that the government must justify its 
imposition of burdens or conferral of benefits on some people and not others. The principal focus 
of these decisions had been on means rather than ends: In light of the government's apparent 
objectives, did it have a legitimate or, occasionally, a compelling reason for treating people differ-
ently? When the Court found an equal protection violation, the government could remedy it 
either by extending benefits to a previously disadvantaged group or by withholding benefits from 
a previously advantaged group; it was not wholly disabled from pursuing its objectives. See Orr 
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979); Railway Expri:ss Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Roe, by contrast, focused primarily on ends, not means. The 
due process clause empowered the judiciary to reassess the affirmative justification for every dep-
rivation of liberty. 
By importing the two-tiered interest analysis of equal protection decisions into the due pro-
cess clause, Roe established an essentially utilitarian framework for evaluating due process 
claims. Nevertheless, the Roe opinion ultimately offered an odd blend of utilitarian and non-
utilitarian thinking. The requirement that a restriction of liberty be justified by a "legitimate" or 
"compelling" governmental interest tilted toward utilitarianism. The legitimate reason for a 
challenged action apparently could not be that the majority favored it, that the action had been 
sanctioned by history, or that the action was supported by deeply felt religious sentiment. Never-
theless, the abortion issue, more clearly than most others, is not susceptible to a purely utilitarian 
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state legislation prohibiting abortion was "consistent with the relative 
weights of the respective interests involved."74 
In the years since Roe, the Supreme Court has not always em-
ployed the two-tiered interest analysis that it employed in that case. 
As Robert Nagel has observed, today's "formulaic Constitution" ap-
pears to reflect the Court's bureaucratic effort to control future deci-
sions. 75 Nevertheless, the Court commonly has added new formulas 
without abandoning old ones, and the proliferation of formulas, far 
from confining discretion, typically has had the opposite effect. The 
Court has been able to select some formulas from an ever-expanding 
smorgasbord while silently disregarding others. 
Most recently, when the Supreme Court upheld a state's prohibi-
tion of homosexual conduct in Bowers v. Hardwick, 76 it invoked pre-
Roe formulations. Fundamental liberties, the Court said, could be re-
garded as those " 'implicit in the concept o( ordered liberty,' such that 
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' "77 
Alternatively, they could be regarded as freedoms " 'deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition.' "78 The Court said that "neither 
of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexu-
als to engage in acts of consensual sodomy" and added that it was not 
"inclined to take a more expansive view of [its] authority to discover 
new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.''79 The 
Court responded to the claim that "there must be a rational basis for 
the law" by declaring that "majority sentiments about the morality of 
homosexuality" were sufficient. 80 It distinguished Roe only with the 
factual observation that Bowers did not involve "abortion" or the deci-
sion "whether or not to beget or bear a child.''81 
Old due process standards never die. Nevertheless, utilitarian for-
resolution. The Supreme Court ultimately drew a mystic line - fetal viability - and declared 
that the governmental interest in protecting potential life became compelling once this strange, 
scholastic line had been passed. 
74. 410 U.S. at 165. 
75. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 178 (1985). 
76. 106 s. Ct. 2841 (1986). 
77. 106 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)). 
78. 106 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(plurality opinion)). 
79. 106 S. Ct. at 2844, 2846. 
80. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. 
81. 106 S. Ct. at 2843, 2844. Two Justices who joined the majority opinion in Bowers, Justice 
Powell and Chief Justice Burger, had joined the majority opinion in Roe. But see Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2192 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) ("The soundness of our holdings must be tested by the decisions that purport to 
follow them. If Danforth and today's holding really mean what they seem to say, I agree we 
should reexamine Roe."). 
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mulations dominated the Supreme Court's analysis when, in 1984, it 
first considered the constitutionality of preventive detention 
legislation. 
B. The Decision in Schall v. Martin 
The plaintiffs in Schall v. Martin 82 sought a declaratory judgment 
that a New York statute permitting the detention of juveniles accused 
of delinquency violated the due process clause. This statute author-
ized a juvenile's detention for no longer than seventeen days83 if there 
appeared "a serious risk that [the juvenile might, before an adjudica-
tive hearing,] commit an act which if committed by an adult would 
constitute a crime."84 
The Constitution establishes a number of prerequisites to the im-
position of criminal punishment, but detention imposed solely for pro-
tective, preventative, or paternalistic purposes is regarded as civil 
rather than criminal in character. 85 Involuntary detention qualifies as 
punishment under the Constitution only when its imposition reflects a 
retributive or deterrent purpose or an attribution of blame. 86 The 
principal argument of the plaintiffs in Schall was that the New York 
statute was "'unconstitutional as to all juveniles' because [it was] ad-
ministered in such a way that 'the detention period serves as punish-
ment imposed without proof of guilt established according to the 
requisite constitutional standard.' " 87 Although the Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, 88 it recognized that the restraint authorized by 
82. 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
83. Although the Second Circuit had indicated that the period of detention might occasion-
ally be somewhat longer, see Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 367 n.5 (2d Cir. 1982), revd. sub 
nom. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), both the majority and dissenting Justices in Schall 
assumed that it could not. See 467 U.S. at 270 (majority opinion); 467 U.S. at 282 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
84. N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983). 
85. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2991-92 (1986). 
86. Cf. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1958, at 
401, 404 ("What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it ... is 
the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition."). 
The Supreme Court has never articulated the touchstone of criminal punishment in language as 
simple as Hart's, but its rulings appear to express about the same principle. See Allen v. Illinois, 
106 S. Ct. 2988, 2991-92 (1986); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-40 (1979); Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). But see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 
(1965). Of course the due process clause may require procedures for the imposition of some 
noncriminal restraints that resemble those required for the imposition of criminal punishment. 
Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
87. Schall, 467 U.S. at 256 (quoting Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 373-74 (2d Cir. 
1982), revd. sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)). 
88. The plaintiffs had offered evidence that many juveniles detained prior to adjudicative 
hearings were not detained after these hearings had been concluded. Because a person who had 
appeared too dangerous to release 17 days before a hearing was likely to have appeared too 
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the statute required justification: 
Two separate inquiries are necessary to [determine whether the statute is 
compatible with the "fundamental fairness" required by due process]. 
First, does preventive detention under the New York statute serve a le-
gitimate state objective? And, second, are the procedural safeguards 
contained in the [Family C~urt Act] adequate to authorize the pretrial 
detention of at least some juveniles charged with crimes?B9 
Three dissenting Justices maintained that more than a "legitimate'' 
state objective was necessary to justify pretrial incarceration, but the 
majority did not consider whether freedom from imprisonment is a 
"fundamental" interest. It failed to explain why it had selected the 
lower of Roe's two tiers. The majority implied, however, that use of a 
more demanding standard would not have affected its analysis: "The 
'legitimate and compelling state interest' in protecting the community 
dangerous to release following a finding of delinquency at this hearing, the plaintiffs suggested 
that much detention in New York had not rested on bona fide findings of dangerousness. Justice 
Rehnquist's majority opinion responded that "the final disposition of a case is 'largely irrelevant' 
to the legality of a pretrial detention." 467 U.S. at 273. The opinion argued that the release of a 
juvenile following an adjudication of delinquency could not establish the reason for his earlier 
incarceration. A number of circumstances, including the emergence of new evidence, might have 
explained the apparent judicial turnabout. 
A remarkable aspect of the Schall litigation, however, was that the trial judge, court of ap· 
peals judges, Supreme Court Justices, and even the defendants' lawyers failed to question the 
plaintiffs' claim that widespread abuse of the New York statute would, if proven, have warranted 
the relief that the plaintiffs sought, a declaration of the statute's invalidity. No one suggested 
that the plaintiffs' survey of the administration of preventive detention in practice (together with 
the heated discussion that it engendered) was itself "largely irrelevant" to the issues that the case 
presented. 
If all statutes that had been frequently abused were unconstitutional, however, one wonders 
how many statutes would survive. Indeed, if preventive detention statutes were unconstitutional 
because they had been used in an unconstitutional way, traditional bail statutes undoubtedly 
would fall as well. Empirical studies have suggested that abusive judges sometimes set high bail 
for the purpose of imposing punishment prior to trial, see Note, A Study of the Administration of 
Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 705 (1958); Note, Compelling Appearance in 
Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1038-41 (1954), and a 
judge willing to use the New York preventive detention statute for unconstitutional purposes 
probably would be willing to misuse traditional bail law as well. The consequence of the empiri· 
cist jurisprudence urged and apparently accepted in Schall might be that all criminal defendants 
would be released on recognizance, however strong the probability that they would flee before 
trial. 
Lawyers and judges have come to view American courts as so little different from legislatures 
that whether it was appropriate for the judiciary to act as an investigative commission was an 
unasked question. No one doubted that courts were empowered to examine much more than the 
facts of litigated cases and the terms of challenged statutes. See Cha yes, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1976). 
A pattern of unconstitutional abuse sometimes justifies injunctive relief against executive of-
ficers - but not against judges, who are immune from suit. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 
349, 355-56 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872). The plaintiffs in Schall 
brought an essentially injunctive action and may have sought to avoid the immunity of New 
York's judges by purporting to challenge the statute that the judges had allegedly abused. The 
statute, however, did not authorize the abuse. Even if judicial immunity were to be abrogated, an 
appropriate injunction would be difficult to frame. It would forbid only the illegitimate use of 
bail and preventive detention statutes, not all use. 
89. 467 U.S. at 263-64 (citations omitted). 
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from crime cannot be doubted."90 
The Court recognized that "[t]he juvenile's countervailing interest 
in freedom from institutional restraints ... is undoubtedly substan-
tial,"91 but it concluded that "the juvenile's liberty interest may, in 
appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's 'parens pa-
triae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.' "92 
In the language of 1984 (the year of Orwell's prophesy), preventive 
detention statutes no longer deprived people of "liberty"; instead, they 
implicated "liberty interests."93 
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justice Brennan and Justice 
Stevens, concluded that a tier somewhat below the "compelling gov-
ernmental interest" tier but well above the "legitimate governmental 
interest" tier was the appropriate shelf for Schall. The "very impor-
tant governmental interest" tier seemed neither too hard nor too soft: 
It is manifest that [the New York statute] impinges upon fundamental 
rights. If the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause means any-
thing, it means freedom from physical restraint. Only a very important 
governmental interest can justify deprivation of liberty in this basic 
sense.94 
90. 467 U.S. at 264. 
91. 467 U.S. at 265. 
92. 467 U.S. at 265. 
93. In an earlier era, judges who bothered to voice the truism that imprisonment deprives 
people of their liberty might not have hesitated to say so directly, using the word liberty as a 
noun (which the dictionary says it is). In the bowdlerized legal language of the 1980s, however, 
rather than declare that imprisonment deprives people of their liberty, even a distinguished judge 
is likely to write, "Pretrial detention implicates a liberty interest .... " United States v. Delker, 
757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3d Cir. 1985) (Adams, J.). 
The use of the word "liberty" as an adjective modifying "interest" is not objectionable pri-
marily because it is inelegant; more importantly, this treatment of liberty as an "interest" trans-
forms it into a bargaining chip. A quick phrase sets the stage for a utilitarian trade. Indeed, in 
our utilitarian legal world, it may not be long before judges declare that "capital punishment 
implicates a life interest." LEXIS indicates that the phrase "liberty interest" has appeared in 
majority or dissenting opinions in 85 Supreme Court cases and that the same phrase has ap-
peared in more than 1000 United States Court of Appeals opinions. The first appearance of the 
phrase in a court of appeals opinion came during the same year that it first appeared in a 
Supreme Court opinion, 1972. The annual total of court of appeals cases in which this solecism 
appeared increased rapidly thereafter. In 1973, the phrase appeared in 3 cases; in 1976, in 33 
cases; in 1979, in 58 cases; in 1982, in 80 cases; and in 1985, in 167 cases. LEXIS searches 
conducted by James Fleissner, J.D., University of Chicago (Genfed library, US and USAPP files) 
(Sept. 1986). 
94. 467 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). At another point in his 
opinion, Justice Marshall said that the New York statute could be justified "only by a weighty 
public interest." 467 U.S. at 291. He elaborated on the appropriate constitutional standard in a 
footnote: 
This standard might be refined in one of two ways. First, it might be argued that because 
[the New York statute] impinges upon "[l]iberty from bodily restraint," which has long been 
"recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause," the provision 
can pass constitutional muster only if it promotes a "compelling" governmental interest. 
Alternatively, it might be argued that the comparatively brief period of incarceration per-
missible under the provision warrants a slight lowering of the constitutional bar .... [I]t 
530 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:510 
In the end, however, the dissenting opinion did not doubt what the 
majority opinion had said cannot be doubted - that the government's 
interest in preventing crime is both legitimate and compelling. The 
opinion concluded: "[E]ven if the purposes identified by the majority 
are conceded to be compelling, they are not sufficiently promoted by 
detention pursuant to [the New York statute] to justify the concomi-
tant impairment of the juveniles' liberty interests."95 This article will 
examine Justice Marshall's analysis of what legal jargon sometimes 
calls "the means-end fit" after exploring some general implications of 
interest balancing. 
C. The Implications of Schall 
When the framers of the fourteenth amendment spoke of liberty, 
they referred to freedom from imprisonment much more clearly than 
they did to reproductive freedom, the ability to engage in interstate 
travel, or the right to vote.96 Moreover, constitutional history aside, 
imprisonment seems, short of death, the most serious deprivation of 
liberty that governments commonly inflict. When Justice Marshall 
maintained that freedom from imprisonment qualifies as a "fundamen-
tal" interest if any does, he voiced common sense. 
Criminal codes, however, contain innumerable statutes that au-
thorize what Justice Marshall called "deprivation[s] of liberty in this 
basic sense." The Justice's interpretation of the due process clause 
would empower courts to consider whether each of these statutes ad-
vanced a "very important" governmental interest. After assessing the 
might be held that an important- but not quite "compelling" - objective is necessary ... , 
In the present context, there is no need to choose between these doctrinal options • , • , 
467 U.S. at 291 n.15 (citations omitted). 
Elsewhere in his opinion, Justice Marshall implied that the Court might engage in open· 
ended balancing that would make any tier-specification unnecessary. He rephrased the first of 
the majority's questions (whether the New York preventive detention statute advanced a legiti-
mate state objective) as whether "the provision promotes legitimate governmental objectives im· 
portant enough to justify the abridgment of the detained juveniles' liberty interests." 467 U.S at 
283 (emphasis added). He also wrote, "To comport with 'fundamental fairness,' [the statute] 
must advance goals commensurate with the burdens it imposes on constitutionally protected 
interests." 467 U.S. at 288. Cf San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing for "a spectrum of standards •.• comprehend[ing] 
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications"). 
95. 467 U.S. at 293. 
96. See E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 90-115, 140-42 (1948); Warren, The 
New ''Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 439-42 (1926); Shat· 
tuck, The True Meaning of the Term ''Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Const/· 
tutions Which Protect, ''Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REV. 365, 368-69, 382 (1891). 
Although the Supreme Court declined in Schall to classify the freedom from institutional con· 
finement as "fundamental," it earlier had accorded that special status to the other freedoms 
mentioned in the text. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (reproductive freedom); Sha· 
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (interstate travel); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 
17 (1964) (the right to vote). 
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reasons for prohibiting marihuana possession, heroin possession, in-
cest, adultery, polygamy, prostitution, gambling, price-fixing, public 
drunkenness, and dozens of other activities, the courts would invali-
date all prohibitions that failed this demanding test. 
The Supreme Court's failure to classify freedom from imprison-
ment as a fundamental interest denied an obvious truth, but it with-
held the broad power that Justice Marshall would have afforded the 
judiciary. The majority's approach to the due process clause empow-
ered courts to reassess only the "legitimacy" of the interests support-
ing criminal statutes. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 however, the Supreme 
Court seemed to doubt that it should have even this power to second-
guess state and federal legislatures. If Bowers was correctly decided -
indeed, if the Supreme Court should stop anywhere short of the posi-
tion advocated by Justice Marshall - the process of two-tiered inter-
est balancing must be deeply flawed. A straightforward application of 
the Court's two-tiered formula would lead to Justice Marshall's 
position. 
Unlike the Court's current interest-balancing interpretations, "fun-
damental fairness" views of the due process clause do not invite courts 
to invalidate all criminal statutes that fail to advance "legitimate" or 
"compelling" governmental interests. These interpretations reflect a 
sense of judicial restraint lacking in more utilitarian formulations. At 
the same time, these interpretations also embody a different concept of 
appropriate judicial activism; they do not fade away whenever a "legit-
imate" or "compelling" governmental interest appears. These inter-
pretations insist that some indignities cannot be excused by the fact 
that they advance strong interests. Treating each individual as an 
"end in himself,"98 they assert that people sometimes have more than 
interests; they have rights. 
Rochin v. California 99 illustrates this difference in approach. In 
Rochin, three deputy sheriffs broke into a bedroom without probable 
cause; discovered a partially dressed narcotics suspect and his wife; 
noticed two capsules on a nightstand and asked, "Whose stuff is 
this?"; then, when the suspect placed the capsules in his mouth, 
"jumped upon" him and struggled to recover the capsules; and finally 
took the suspect to a hospital where, at their direction, a doctor forced 
a tube into the suspect's stomach, poured down an emetic solution to 
97. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). Bowers is described in text at notes 76-81 supra. 
98. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, in THE MORAL LAW 
96 (H. Paton trans. 1967). 
99. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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induce vomiting, and recovered the capsules. The capsules led to the 
suspect's conviction of morphine possession. 
In his opinion for the Supreme Court in 1952, Justice Frankfurter 
noted that "[s]tates in their prosecutions [must] respect certain decen-
cies of civilized conduct."100 He described the due process clause as 
"a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal 
immunities which . . . are 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty.' " 101 Calling the sheriffs' behavior "conduct that shocks the con-
science,"102 the Court reversed the suspect's conviction. 
If the Supreme Court were to analyze Rochin under the due pro-
cess clause today, it might proceed in a different way. 103 The Court 
might note that the sheriffs' brutality had implicated a "liberty inter-
est," probably a "fundamental" liberty interest; then it might insist 
that all acts of police brutality must be justified by "compelling" gov-
ernmental interests.104 Presumably the Court would not deny, how-
ever, that the state's interest in the enforcement of its narcotics laws is 
compelling, nor would it deny that the methods employed in Rochin 
had advanced this interest in a direct and substantial way (satisfying 
the constitutional requirement of an appropriate "means-end fit" 105). 
If the Court took its two-tiered, interest-balancing formula seriously, it 
would affirm the suspect's conviction. The Court's current view of the 
due process clause, if seriously intended, would invalidate all penal 
statutes that failed to advance important interests while upholding all 
police brutality that did further important interests. This view seems 
at once too activist and too restrained. 
D. Balancing and Detention: Of Predicates and Predictions 
Predictions of future misconduct frequently influence decisions 
about whether and how long to imprison people. They inform the 
imposition of sentence (including the choice between prison and pro-
bation), the grant or denial of bail pending appeal, the decision 
100. 342 U.S. at 173. 
101. 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
102. 342 U.S. at 172. 
103. Because the Supreme Court has now "incorporated" the fourth amendment's prohibi-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures within the due process clause, it probably would not 
invoke its general due process standards in a case like Rochin. It would instead analyze the case 
as though the fourth amendment were directly applicable. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 
(1985). 
104. Cf. Winston, 470 U.S. at 762 ("Weighed against these individual interests [described as 
'the life or health of the suspect' and his 'dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integ-
rity,' 467 U.S. at 761] is the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or 
innocence."). 
105. See text at notes 121-28 infra. 
December 1986] Preventive Detention 533 
whether to release on parole, and many other choices within the crimi-
nal justice system.106 In addition, various forms of civil commitment 
rest in part on official assessments of dangerousness. 
Almost invariably, however, preventive detention requires some-
thing more - some additional predicate for a deprivation of liberty, 
some perceived moral requisite to making the official prediction. This 
"something more" is sometimes a status, one that suggests a person's 
inability to control the danger that he poses. Civil commitment stat-
utes typically authorize the detention, not of everyone thought danger-
ous to himself or others, but of people who appear "mentally ill" and 
dangerous or who are thought dangerous because they have a commu-
nicable disease.107 Within the criminal justice system, however, the 
predicate is rarely a status. It is instead an act, 108 one that bespeaks 
culpability and that itself is believed to justify an exercise of state 
power. In assessing measures of preventive detention, it is appropriate 
to consider both the strength of the asserted predicate for prediction 
and the strength of the prediction itself. 
The preventive pretrial detention authorized by the Federal Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 and by recent state enactments109 lacks the predi-
cate for prediction that our criminal justice system most frequently 
requires, proof of voluntary wrongdoing beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For this reason, some opponents of preventive detention have con-
tended that the incarceration only of people charged with crime is ir-
rational; this detention rests on a principle that would authorize the 
imprisonment of everyone thought dangerous.110 This objection seems 
unsound. A charge of past misconduct, coupled with a determination 
of probable cause, m provides a predicate for prediction. This predi-
106. For lists of situations in which criminal justice officials make predictions of future be-
havior, see J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VlOLENT BEHAVlOR: AN AssESSMENT OF CLINICAL 
TECHNIQUES 22-23 (1981); Morris & Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUSTICE: 
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF REsEARCH 1, 4 n.2, 7-10 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1985). 
107. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2 para. 1-119 (1985) (authorizing involuntary con-
finement when a person is "mentally ill and •.. because of his illness is reasonably expected to 
inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future"); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 
111 1/2 para. 22 (1985) (affording the Department of Public Health "supreme authority in mat-
ters of quarantine"); People ex rel Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 433-34, 134 N.E. 815, 
819-20 (1922) (interpreting the latter statute to authorize the involuntary confinement of people 
with communicable diseases). 
108. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding criminalization of the status of 
being a narcotics addict unconstitutional). 
109. E.g .. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (Supp. II 1984); CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 12(b); COLO. 
CONST. art. II, § 19; TEXAS CONST. art I, § 1 la. 
110. See, e.g., Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 
56 VA. L. REV. 371, 405 (1970). . 
111. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (described in text at notes 207-10 infra). 
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cate may be slight. It may in fact be constitutionally inadequate. 112 
Nevertheless, even this limited predicate differentiates current schemes 
of pretrial detention from "pure" preventive detention schemes -
schemes grounded solely on official judgments of dangerousness that 
look to the future without regard for the past.113 
The assessment of a "pure" preventive detention scheme may, 
however, provide a foundation for analyzing the less restrictive enact-
ments of Congress and state legislatures. Imagine that psychologists 
at Menninger University have developed a written test, the Menninger 
Multiphasic Dangerousness Inventory or MMDI. The test asks sub-
jects to record the extent of their agreement or disagreement with 
statements like: "My mother is insecure," "My father obtained a bet-
ter-paying job at least once during my childhood," "I prefer western 
movies to situation comedies," "I sometimes wet my bed as a child," 
and "I am fascinated by fire." 114 After pretesting and refining the 
MMDI, the psychologists have administered it to a large random sam-
ple of the population. Careful follow-up studies have revealed that, 
although only 0.7 percent of the population scored 140 points or 
higher on the test, 69.2 percent of the subjects with these high scores 
were convicted of serious crimes within the next two years. 
Impressed by this evidence, a state legislature has required every-
one to take the MMDI. It has provided for the administrative deten-
tion in secure but nonpunitive facilities of people who score 140 points 
or higher. Prior to detention, these people are to be afforded hearings 
with full procedural safeguards on the single determinative issue -
whether they failed the test. They are to be detained only until they 
reduce their scores to an acceptable level. The principal constitutional 
issue posed by this scheme of "pure" (or predicate-less) preventive de-
tention is one of substantive rather than procedural due process, 115 
112. See text at notes 177-253 infra. 
113. In United States v. Salemo, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 397 (1986), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit maintained that the pretrial detention 
authorized by the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 cannot be distinguished from detention solely 
on grounds of dangerousness. This argument provides one of the few points of disagreement 
between the opinion in Salerno and this article. 
114. Agreement with propositions like these may in fact indicate dangerous propensities. See 
J. MONAHAN, supra note 106, at 69-71; Yesavage, Werner, Becker & Mills, Short-Term Civil 
Commitment and the Violent Patient, 139 AM. J, PSYCHIATRY 1145, 1149 (1982) ("[A] number 
of BPRS scales [Brief Psychiatric Rating Scales] were significantly associated with inpatient vio-
lent behavior. For example, total BPRS scores and scale scores for grandiosity, excitement, unu-
sual thought content, anxiety, and conceptual disorganization were significantly correlated with 
total ward behavior scores."). 
115. The effort to characterize due process questions as either "substantive" or "procedural" 
sometimes seems artificial. By characterizing the MMDI as a "procedure" for determining dan-
gerousness, one might contend that its use raises procedural rather than substantive issues. By 
December 1986] Preventive Detention 535 
and analysis of this issue requires further examination of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Schall v. Martin. 
Schall considered only the preventive detention of juveniles, and 
the Court indicated that the detention of adults would pose different 
issues. After noting that a juvenile's "interest in freedom from institu-
tional restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is undoubtedly 
substantial," the majority said: "But that interest must be qualified by 
the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form 
of custody."116 
This statement provoked a strident response of the sort that has 
become increasingly common in Supreme Court opinions. Justice 
Marshall wrote in dissent that the majority's "characterization of pre-
ventive detention as merely a transfer of custody from a parent or 
guardian to the State is difficult to take seriously."117 The majority, 
however, had not characterized preventive detention merely as a trans-
fer of custody from a parent to the state. To the contrary, it had rec-
ognized that a juvenile's interest in freedom from institutional 
restraints is substantial. The Justices in the majority apparently did 
think it relevant, however, that juveniles have less freedom than 
adults. Without affording them hearings, the state effectively deprives 
children of liberty when it detains them in schools for most of the day. 
Moreover, when juveniles run away, the state sends them home. 
Although full-time institutional confinement restricts juveniles as 
much as adults, the deprivation of liberty may be somewhat less for 
juveniles because juveniles have somewhat less liberty to begin with. 
Much more importantly, there are reasons for the state's assertion 
of special power over juveniles. The majority noted in Schall that 
"[c]hildren, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take 
care ofthemselves."118 In schemes of preventive pretrial detention for 
adult criminal defendants, the only predicate for detention other than 
a prediction of future misconduct is the act that has led to the filing of 
a criminal charge - an act not yet established by proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence. In schemes 
of pretrial detention for juveniles, by contrast, the predicate is both an 
act and a status, a status that suggests an incomplete ability to control 
assertedly dangerous behavior. An arrest for delinquency offers at 
least some reason to suspect, in the majority's words, that "parental 
the same token, one might characterize a seemingly substantive drunk driving provision as estab-
lishing a procedure for identifying and isolating those drivers who are likely to have accidents. 
116. 467 U.S. at 265. 
117. 467 U.S. at 289. 
118. 467 U.S. at 265. 
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control [may have] falter[ed]." 119 When a preliminary inquiry offers 
additional reason for concern, the state may respond to the perceived 
parental failure in the short run while it considers how best to respond 
to it in the long run. 
In judging the constitutionality of the pretrial detention of adults, 
a court might distinguish Schall on the ground that the detention of 
juveniles presents different issues. For the court then to treat Schall as 
irrelevant, however, would be disingenuous. Schall's significance as a 
precedent lies primarily in the framework of analysis that the Supreme 
Court employed, and this framework appears to make immaterial 
every difference between the detention of juveniles and the detention of 
adults. 
Indeed, the Court's two-tiered framework seems to mandate the 
conclusion not only that every scheme of adult pretrial detention en-
acted by state and federal legislatures is constitutional but that deten-
tion simply on the basis of test scores would be constitutional as well. 
This framework omits any consideration of the moral predicate tradi-
tionally required for detention. The Court's formula looks to the "lib-
erty interest" lost when a person is imprisoned and to the 
"governmental interest" advanced by this imprisonment. The absence 
of past misconduct or of an inability to control one's behavior does not 
seem to matter at all. 
The "liberty interest" of adults may be stronger than the "liberty 
interest" of juveniles. Under the Supreme Court's two-tiered formula, 
however, a compelling governmental interest triumphs over every lib-
erty interest. The governmental interest supporting existing schemes 
of adult preventive detention - and supporting schemes that would 
detain people who have failed psychological tests - is no different 
from the governmental interest that supported the scheme of detention 
in Schall: "The 'legitimate and compelling state interest' in protecting 
the community from crime cannot be doubted." 120 The detention of 
adults can advance this interest as much as the detention of juveniles, 
and so may detention on the basis of test scores. If taken seriously, 
current modes of legal analysis end the battle over the preventive de-
tention of adults before a shot has been fired. Indeed, they deliver 
overwhelming armaments to those who would uphold "pure" schemes 
of preventive detention on the basis of psychological tests. 
it9. 467 U.S. at 265. 
120. 467 U.S. at 264. 
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A. A Prediction and the Means-End Fit: Of False Positives and 
False Science 
Under the Supreme Court's decisions, the fact that a challenged 
governmental action advances a compelling interest is not always deci-
sive. The Court sometimes considers how much the challenged action 
advances this governmental interest. In one context it has said, "If the 
State's objective is legitimate and important, we next determine 
whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective 
and means is present."121 Descriptions of the required "means-end 
fit" have varied enormously, however, both because the issue has 
arisen in different contexts122 and because the Court typically has re-
solved it in a quick word or phrase. The Court sometimes has said 
only that a challenged governmental action must not be "wholly irrel-
evant to the achievement of the State's objective"123 or that it must not 
"achieve[] its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way."124 
On other occasions, the Court has said that the challenged action must 
"directly advance[] the governmental interest asserted,"125 "must be 
substantially related to the achievement of [its] objectives,"126 or must 
have "a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."127 
On still other occasions, the Court has said that the challenged action 
must be" 'necessary ... to the accomplishment' of its purpose."128 
In his dissent in Schall, Justice Marshall invoked the "means-end" 
branch of the Supreme Court's two-tiered, interest-balancing, due pro-
cess formula. He protested that preventive detention was not preven-
tive enough to achieve a suitable means-ends match: 
Both of the courts below concluded that only occasionally and acci-
dentally does pretrial detention of a juvenile under [the New York stat-
ute] prevent the commission of a crime. . . . Family Court judges are 
incapable of determining which of the juveniles who appear before them 
121. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). 
122. "Heightened" judicial scrutiny apparently requires a tighter "means-end fit" than "mid-
level" review; and "mid-level" review requires a tighter "fit" than "ordinary" review. Although 
it is difficult to say, the Supreme Court also may have created different standards for "commer-
cial" speech, "symbolic" speech, and speech limited as to "time, place, and manner." 
123. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). 
124. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980). 
125. Central Hudson Gas & Blee. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
126. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
127. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
128. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
196 (1964)); see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
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would commit offenses before their trials if left at large and which would 
not. . . . On the basis of evidence adduced at trial, supplemented by a 
thorough review of the secondary literature, the District Court found 
that "no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even the 
most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which juveniles 
will engage in violent crime." The evidence supportive of this finding is 
overwhelming.129 
The majority responded: 
Our cases indicate ... that from a legal point of view there is nothing 
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct. 
Such a judgment forms an important element in many decisions, and we 
have specifically rejected the contention, based on the same sort of socio-
logical data relied upon by appellees and the District Court, "that it is 
impossible to predict future behavior and that the question is so vague as 
to be meaningless."130 
Justice Marshall's observation that all of the cases upon which the 
majority relied involved defendants already convicted of crime131 did 
not answer the majority's contention. The Supreme Court had indeed, 
"from a legal point of view," rejected the proposition upon which Jus-
tice Marshall relied, the asserted impossibility of predicting criminal 
behavior. 
This proposition, however, has been widely accepted elsewhere. 
John Monahan has written, "Rarely have research data been as 
quickly or nearly universally accepted by the academic and profes-
sional communities as those supporting the proposition that mental 
health professionals are highly inaccurate at predicting violent behav-
ior." 132 Monahan has summarized the social science research by 
saying: 
[T]he "best" clinical research currently in existence indicates that psy-
chiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of 
three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period among 
institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in the 
past ... and who were diagnosed as mentally ill.133 
129. Schall, 467 U.S. at 293-94 (quoting United States ex rel Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. 
Supp. 691, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), ajfd., 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)). Justice Marshall argued in addition that the limited information 
available to a New York judge at the time of a detention hearing aggravated the difficulty of 
accurate prediction. 467 U.S. at 294. 
130. 467 U.S. at 278-79 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)). 
131. 467 U.S. at 294 n.20. 
132. J. MONAHAN, supra note 106, at 27. 
133. Id. at 77 (emphasis omitted); see also B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL 
PATIENTS 20 (1978) ("[I]t now seems beyond dispute that mental health professionals have no 
expertise in predicting future dangerous behavior, either to self or others. In fact, predictions of 
dangerous behavior are wrong about 95 percent of the time.") (emphasis in original); Monahan, 
The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. 
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Although the academic research has focused primarily on predictions 
by mental health professionals, there is little reason to believe that 
judges can predict what psychologists and psychiatrists cannot. 
Justice Blackmun and two other Justices who joined his dissenting 
opinion in Barefoot v. Estelle 134 accepted this pessimistic view of the 
social science findings. The issue in Barefoot was whether the Consti-
tution allows the introduction of psychiatric predictions of violence at 
capital sentencing hearings, and Justice Blackmun wrote, "The Court 
holds that psychiatric testimony about a defendant's future dangerous-
ness is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony is wrong two 
times out of three."135 Justice Blackmun's statement, however, was 
inaccurate or misleading in six significant respects. Contrary to the 
"nearly universal" view of academic and professional communities, 
the available evidence does not support the claim that predictions of 
future criminality are inherently or even usually inaccurate. A fair 
assessment of current predictive capacities offers no basis for con-
demning all forms of preventive pretrial detention. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court's two-tiered formula yields no other credible objec-
tions to preventive incarceration. Stronger objections to this detention 
(at least in the form authorized by the Federal Bail Reform Act of 
1984) lie elsewhere. 
First, no study has suggested that "psychiatric testimony about a 
defendant's future dangerousness ... is wrong two times out of three." 
In predicting whether a flipped quarter will come up "heads," a ran-
dom guess may prove accurate half the time; and if one can anticipate 
that an event will occur more frequently than not or less frequently 
than not, one can improve this fifty percent average by automatically 
predicting it or failing to predict it in every case. To be wrong sub-
stantially more than half the time in a series of yes-or-no predictions is 
to be very wrong, and no study has claimed that even mental health 
professionals are so bad. 
The literature of prediction distinguishes between "positive" pre-
dictions - judgments that an event will occur - and "negative" pre-
dictions - judgments that the event will not occur. This literature 
speaks of "true positives" (predictions of the event's occurrence that 
later are vindicated), "false positives" (predictions of the event's oc-
J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 10 (1984) ("Even in the best of circumstances - with lengthy multidiscipli-
nary evaluations of persons who had already manifested their violent proclivities on several occa-
sions - psychiatrists and psychologists seemed to be wrong at least twice as often as they were 
right when they predicted violence."); Morris & Miller, supra note 106, at 3. 
134. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
135. 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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currence that later appear false), "true negatives" (predictions of the 
event's nonoccurrence that later are verified), and "false negatives" 
(predictions of the event's nonoccurrence that later appear 
incorrect).136 
Contrary to Justice Blackmun's apparent suggestion, the claim 
that the predictions of mental health professionals are wrong two-
thirds of the time speaks only of their positive predictions. In one 
influential study, for example, only 34. 7 percent of the patients classi-
fied as dangerous by mental health professionals but released by a 
court committed serious assaults within five years. 137 In this study as 
in every other, however, the professionals' negative predictions, judged 
by the same measure, were overwhelmingly accurate. Ninety-two per-
cent of the patients released by the court with the professionals' ap-
proval were not arrested for serious assaults within the study 
period. 138 The professionals therefore were not wrong two-thirds of 
the time; they were correct eighty-six percent of the time.139 
In assessing schemes of preventive detention, focusing exclusively 
on positive predictions may be appropriate. The ratio of "true posi-
tives" to "false positives" is more important than the overall rate of 
predictive success. Only a "true positive" prediction can prevent a 
crime; only a "false positive" prediction can lead to incarceration that 
in fact serves no incapacitative purpose. Nevertheless, Justice Black-
mun was in error in Barefoot when he characterized the predictions of 
mental health professionals as "less accurate than the flip of a coin."140 
Second, even the ratio of true positive predictions to false positive 
predictions commonly has exceeded one in three. Indeed, because the 
overall recidivism rate of people convicted of crime is approximately 
136. See J. MONAHAN, supra note 106, at 47-49. 
137. Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 371, 390 (1972). 
138. Id. 
139. See id. at 389-90 (31 of 386 patients classified as nondangerous were arrested for serious 
assaults within the study period and were therefore viewed as "false negatives"; 32 of 49 patients 
classified as dangerous but released by the court were not arrested for serious assaults within the 
study period and were therefore viewed as "false positives"; the overall error rate accordingly 
was 63 of 435 cases or 14 percent). Moreover, the assertion that the professionals were correct 
86 percent of the time omits 226 cases in which they might have been correct- those in which 
judges accepted the professionals' assessments of dangerousness and ordered hospitalization so 
that no experimental evaluation could occur. See id. at 378; text at notes 151-52 infra. 
It seems worth noting as a postscript to this observation that 14 of the 49 released patients 
whom the authors had classified as dangerous would not have been so classified under criteria 
that the authors later developed; the exclusion of these patients probably would have yielded a 
ratio of true to false positives greater than fifty percent. See Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, Dan· 
gerousness, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 554, 554-55 (1973) (letter to the editor in reply to Monahan). 
140. 463 U.S. at 931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the 
Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 737 (1974)), 
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one in three, 141 positive predictions based only on the single variable of 
past conviction would achieve what most commentators appear to re-
gard as the highest degree of accuracy attainable by current methods. 
Prior imprisonment for a felony, moreover, is a significantly better 
predictor of future criminality than prior conviction. Treating peni-
tentiary imprisonment, by itself, as a predictor of recidivism 142 appar-
ently would improve the ratio of true to false positives to fifty percent 
or more. Sixty percent of a sample of 539 inmates released from Illi-
nois penitentiaries were arrested for new crimes within twenty-nine 
months of their release; 143 and although rearrest rates were higher for 
offenders who had committed crimes against property than for violent 
offenders, 144 half of the violent offenders in the sample were arrested 
for new crimes within the study period.145 More than three-quarters 
of the youngest group of released inmates and more than three-
quarters of the inmates who had been incarcerated on three prior occa-
sions were arrested. 146 In short, when future arrest is the variable to 
be predicted, isolating some groups whose actuarial "base expectancy 
rate" greatly exceeds one in three does not seem difficult. Indeed, even 
when subsequent conviction (rather than arrest) is the dependent vari-
able, some identifiable groups of violent, repeat offenders appear to 
have "base expectancy rates" of fifty percent or more. 147 A number of 
141. See c. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 373 (1978); D. GLASER, 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 13-35 (1964). 
142. I refer to recidivism measured by arrest rather than conviction. See note 155 infra. 
143. See ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, REsEARCH BULLETIN 
No. 3: THE IMPACT OF PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY ON RECIDIVISM IN ILLINOIS l, 4 (1986) 
[hereinafter RECIDIVISM IN ILLINOIS]. 
144. Recidivism rates generally are somewhat lower for violent than for nonviolent offenders. 
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL RE-
PORT: EXAMINING RECIDIVISM 4, table 6 (1985). 
145. RECIDIVISM IN ILLINOIS, supra note 143, at 7. 
146. Id. at 1, 2. 
147. Three different British samples demonstrated "that one variable alone - having three 
or more previous convictions for violence - identified groups of offenders of whom more than 
[fifty percent] were subsequently reconvicted of violence." J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG, DANGER-
OUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 184 (1981). In each of the British studies, there was reason to 
believe that the fifty percent figure was conservative. One of these studies followed the criminal 
careers of 264 people who had been initially convicted of violent offenses in 1947. By 1958, 55 
percent of the people who had been convicted of a fourth violent offense also had been convicted 
of a fifth. At the time of the study's cut-off date, some people might have been convicted of their 
fourth offenses so recently that they simply had not had adequate opportunities to commit fur-
ther crime. Many, in fact, might have been in prison. Each of the other studies followed their 
subjects for five or six years after they had been convicted of violent offenses a third or fourth 
time. The studies reported the commission of additional violent crimes (measured by conviction, 
not arrest) by 52 percent and 54 percent of the subjects. Presumably some of these subjects also 
had been incarcerated during most or all of the follow-up period. They, too, might have been 
substantially disabled from joining the ranks of "true positives." See id. (describing N. WALKER, 
w. HAMMOND & D. STEER, THE VIOLENT OFFENDER - REALITY OR ILLUSION? (Oxford 
Univiversity Penal Research Unit Occasional Paper No. 1, 1970) (reporting the results of two 
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studies of clinical ("nonactuarial") predictions similarly have yielded 
substantially better than one-to-three ratios of true to false positives. 148 
Third, virtually all of the studies that yielded low ratios of true to 
false positives (and most other studies as well) grew out of two situa-
tions - those in which courts rejected the recommendations of mental 
health professionals and ordered the release of people whom these pro-
fessionals had classified as dangerous149 and those in which courts or-
dered the transfer of people from institutions for the "criminally 
insane" (where they apparently had been confined because psycholo-
gists had regarded them as dangerous150) to other mental facilities.1s1 
In the first situation, arrest for a violent crime within a specified period 
was treated as the measure of accuracy of a professional judgment of 
dangerousness; in the second, the commission of assaults in the "non-
criminal" hospitals tested whether the earlier judgments of dangerous-
ness had been correct. 
The recommendations of mental health professionals that judges 
reject, however, are likely to be less well grounded than those that they 
accept. The professional recommendations that yielded low ratios of 
true to false positives were those that initially had seemed most dubi-
ous. Certainly if all of the people whom the professionals had classi-
fied as dangerous had been released, their ratio of true to false 
studies); G. PHILLPOTI'S & L. LANCUCKI, PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS, SENTENCE AND RECON· 
VICTION: A STATISflCAL STUDY OF A SAMPLE OF 5000 OFFENDERS CONVICTED IN JANUARY 
1971 (Home Office Research Study No. 53, 1979)). 
148. See Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Services, State of Maryland, Maryland's De· 
fective Delinquency Statute - A Progress Report (1978) (unpublished) [hereinafter Maryland 
Report] (summarized in J. MONAHAN, supra note 106, at 73-74) (46 percent of the patients 
released unconditionally against staff advice committed new offenses - not necessarily violent 
offenses - within three years; 39 percent of those released to outpatient treatment against staff 
advice committed new offenses; and 7 percent of those released to outpatient treatment with staff 
approval committed new offenses); Steadman, A New Look at Recidivism Among Patuxent In· 
mates, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 200, 209 (1977) (41 percent of the patients re-
leased against staff advice apparently committed violent offenses within three years while 31 
percent of those released with staff approval did so); Hodges, Crime Prevention by the Indetermi-
nate Sentence Law, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 291, 293 (1971) (81 percent of the convicted sex 
offenders who, contrary to staff advice, were not confined committed new crimes within three 
years; 71 percent of those initially confined but later released against staff recommendations com-
mitted new crimes; and 37 percent of those released with staff approval committed new crimes). 
149. E.g., Maryland Report, supra note 148; Cohen, Groth & Siegal, The Clinical Prediction 
of Dangerousness, 24 CRIME & DELINQ. 28 (1978); Steadman, supra note 148; Kozol, Boucher & 
Garofalo, supra note 137; Hodges, supra note 148. 
150. See Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: 
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1093-94 (1976) (recognizing that the 
authors' earlier study had inferred psychiatric judgments of dangerousness from the fact that 
patients had been confined in hospitals for the criminally insane; no direct evidence of these 
psychiatric judgments - or of how long ago they had been made - was available). 
151. See H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE (1974); T. 
THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: A COMMUNITY FOLLOW·UP OF MEN· 
TALLY ILL OFFENDERS (1979). 
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positives might have been much higher. 152 Similarly, the failure of 
mental patients to commit assaults while they remained in custody 
(presumably with attendants at the elbow much of the time) provides 
weak evidence that they had been erroneously classified as 
dangerous. 153 
Fourth, none of the studies involved predictions of the behavior of 
people recently convicted of capital murder (the relevant population in 
Barefoot) or of people recently arrested for serious crimes (the people 
generally subject to preventive pretrial detention under current state 
and federal enactments). It might be substantially easier to attain a 
high ratio of true to false positives with these high-risk groups than 
with people whom judges had released to the community and with 
transferred mental patients who had been confined for an average of 
fifteen years and whose average age was fifty-two. 154 The most clearly 
dangerous people are rarely the subjects of empirical study. When 
these people appear recently to have manifested their dangerousness in 
serious criminal conduct, courts do not often release them. Neverthe-
less, the ability to identify these people was at issue in Barefoot and is 
at issue in evaluating current schemes of preventive pretrial detention. 
Fifth, although an arrest for a violent crime may validate a mental 
health professional's judgment of dangerousness, 155 the failure to 
arrest for a violent crime does not falsify this judgment. Many crimes 
go undetected, and the number of false positives cannot be known. To 
assume that the professionals' predictions were correct more fre-
quently than subsequent arrests proved them correct would be inap-
propriate. Nevertheless, to characterize the unverified predictions as 
"wrong," as Justice Blackmun did in Barefoot, would be equally inap-
152. See Litwack, The Prediction of Violence, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST, Fall 1985, at 87, 87-
88. Moreover, if a low ratio of true to false positives among released patients indicates the inabil-
ity of professionals to make accurate predictions, it also indicates the judges' predictive success. 
All of the cases that were false positives for the professionals appear to have been true negatives 
for the judges. 
153. Some of the transferred patients ultimately were released to the community where, 
within two and one-half years, only eight percent were convicted of new offenses. See Steadman 
& Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxtrom Patients: 1966-
1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304, 307-08 (1972). Presumably, however, these patients - a 
small minority of all the transferred patients - had been released only because they no longer 
were considered sufficiently dangerous to confine. But cf H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA, supra 
note 151, at 117-18, 125 (concluding, oddly, that release decisions were not based on "past and 
present dangerousness" while reporting that they were based on psychiatric "impi:ovement"). 
154. See id. at 78. To infer an inability to predict the future criminality of capital murderers 
from studies of aging mental patients is like inferring an odds-maker's inability to predict a New 
York Giants victory over the Slippery Rock eleven from his low rate of success in predicting the 
team's victories over the Denver Broncos. 
155. Arrest may be a better factual indicator of guilt than conviction in an overburdened 
legal system that affords prosecutors broad discretion to decline, divert, and bargain. Obviously, 
however, arrest remains a fallible indicator. 
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propriate. All of the studies established only the professionals' mini-
mum rate of success.156 
The sixth reason why the empirical studies fail to establish either 
the impossibility of predicting criminal conduct or the failure of past 
efforts is the most significant. An anecdote recounted by John 
Monahan indicates a defect of all of these studies: 
[At a judicial sentencing conference] I gave my stock speech about the 
probability of violence never being higher than 1-in-3 in the research. A 
judge raised his hand and said that he recently had a case of a murderer 
with a large number of prior violent offenses who, when asked if he had 
anything to say before sentence was imposed, stated "if I get out, the first 
thing I am going to do is murder the prosecutor, the second thing I am 
going to do is murder you, Your Honor, the third thing I am going to do 
is murder every witness who testified against me and the fourth thing I 
am going to do is murder each member of the jury." The judge asked ifl 
thought that this person's probability of violence was no greater than l-
in-3. I called for a coffee break. 157 
Although predicting the weather is a difficult task, almost anyone 
can do it when a funnel cloud is headed in his direction. 158 Norval 
Morris and Marc Miller, after accepting the common judgment that 
future violence cannot be predicted with greater than one-in-three ac-
curacy, recognized that the cases of "a few very rare individuals" of-
156. For speculation about how many of the professionals' unverified predictions were likely 
to have been false, see J. MONAHAN, supra note 106, at 81-85. 
My objection to the common academic disparagement of the predictions of mental health 
professionals should not be read as claiming that the professionals have special predictive powers. 
None of the studies have examined whether professionals are more successful at predicting be-
havior than lay people, and the judgment of the American Psychiatric Association is that psychi-
atrists have no special ability to predict violent behavior. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899-902 
(describing an amicus brief filed by the APA); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssOCIATION, 
CLINICAL AsPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 30 (1974); American Psychological Associa-
tion, Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978). 
Similarly, the discussion in the text should not be read as endorsing the Supreme Court's 
affirmation of the death sentence in Barefoot. One of the psychiatrists who testified in Barefoot 
was Dr. James Grigson, Dallas' infamous "Dr. Death." Although Dr. Grigson had never ex-
amined Barefoot and although the only act of violence of which Barefoot had been convicted was 
the one for which he was to be sentenced, Dr. Grigson testified on the basis of hypothetical 
questions that the likelihood that Barefoot would commit future crimes of violence was "one 
hundred percent and absolute." Judging "sociopathic personality disorder" on a scale of one to 
ten, Dr. Grigson rated Barefoot "above ten." Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). A death sentence that may have rested in part on Dr. Grigson's testimony seems as incon-
sistent with due process as one grounded on a prophesy of future violence by Jeanne Dixon. 
157. Letter from John Monahan to Norval Morris (Feb. 27, 1984), quoted in Morris & 
Miller, supra note 106, at 17 n.14. 
158. See Litwack, supra note 152, at 87 ("There is no research that contradicts the common 
sense notion that when an individual has clearly exhibited a recent history of repeated violence, it 
is reasonable to assume that that individual is likely to act violently again in the foreseeable 
future unless there has been a significant change in the attitudes or circumstances that have 
repeatedly led to violence in the recent past."). 
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fered exceptions to this generalization.159 These funnel clouds, 
however, should not merely be acknowledged and forgotten. 160 
For one thing, funnel clouds may be substantially more frequent in 
the criminal justice system than they are on the Texas panhandle. The 
records of cases that have arisen under the preventive detention provi-
sions of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 often have presented 
abundant evidence of defendants' firm commitment to crime as a way 
of life. In many of these cases, continuing criminality seemed close to 
certain if the defendants were to be released. 161 Moreover, however 
rare these cases may be, they mark one end of a spectrum. On this 
spectrum, cases in which predictions offuture criminality can be made 
with near certainty are followed by those in which these predictions 
can be made with substantial confidence, then by those in which con-
tinuing violence seems more likely than not, then by those in which 
future violence seems only a significant possibility. 
At any point along this spectrum, one may draw a line marking 
"dangerousness." Under the Federal Bail Reform Act, for example, 
judges must determine when the release of a defendant will not "rea-
sonably" assure the safety of any other person and the community.162 
To suggest that, wherever the line is drawn, the ratio of true positive 
to false positive predictions cannot be higher than one-in-three simply 
defies belief. 
159. See Morris & Miller, supra note 106, at 17. 
160. A study of recidivism in Illinois offered the following case history: 
"Jack" began his officially-recorded adult criminal career at the age of 17 with an arrest for 
burglary. Two and one-half years later he was arrested for unlawful use of a weapon, and 
two years after that, at the age of 22, he was arrested for theft. Following this arrest, barely 
a year elapsed before Jack was arrested again - this time for murder and armed robbery. 
Between the time he was arrested and incarcerated on the murder charge, Jack was arrested 
four more times - twice for attempted murder and once each for armed robbery and at-
tempted armed robbery. Just 16 months after completing his sentence for murder, Jack was 
arrested for armed robbery, kidnapping, and armed violence. 
RECIDIVISM IN ILLINOIS, supra note 143, at 2 (emphasis omitted). "Jack's" case should not be 
disregarded on the ground that it is atypical; unusual cases, like routine cases, must be decided. 
Some authority in the criminal justice system must determine whether, if "Jack" is able to post 
bond, he ought to be released pending trial. 
161. E.g., United States v. Salemo, 631 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 794 F.2d 64 (2d 
Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986); United States v. Rawls, 620 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Pa. 
1985); United States v. Daniels, 622 F. Supp. 178 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd., 783 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Buck, 609 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
162. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (Supp. II 1984). The "reasonable assurance" language is subject to 
a variety of interpretations. For federal courts to specify the degree of confidence necessary to 
support a prediction of future criminality with more precision than the statute does itself would 
seem feasible, appropriate, and desirable. For example, the appropriate standard might be a 
"manifest danger of serious criminal conduct during the pretrial period," or a "grave risk of 
serious criminal conduct," or a "clear and present danger of serious criminal conduct." The 
legislative history of the Bail Reform Act appears to indicate a purpose to limit pretrial confine-
ment more narrowly than federal prosecutors and judges have limited it in practice. See United 
States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890-92 (8th Cir. 1985); text at note 22 supra. 
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In fact, none of the empirical studies indicated the level of confi-
dence at which the predictions that they purportedly tested were 
made. Some studies hinted that this level might have been low. One 
noted a "strong psychiatric conservatism" in deciding whether to re-
lease patients to the community. 163 Another defined dangerousness 
simply as "a potential for inflicting serious bodily harm."164 Indeed, 
in virtually all of the studies, mental health professionals were left at 
large to set their own standards of dangerousness. 
A psychologist asked to determine whether a person is dangerous 
and to recommend whether he should be released may conclude that 
the odds are one in three that this person would, if released, commit a 
violent crime. A one-in-three risk of violence is likely to seem substan-
tial. The psychologist may therefore classify the person as dangerous 
and recommend against release. He may draw similar conclusions in 
many other cases. A judge, however, may set a higher threshold and 
reject the psychologist's recommendations. 
Several years later, a social scientist may conduct a study and dis-
cover that only one in three of the people whom the psychologist had 
classified as dangerous had committed a violent crime following his 
release. Were this researcher to accept the fallacy that has infected 
most studies of prediction, he would treat the psychologist's judg-
ments of dangerousness as though they had been firm predictions that 
every person viewed as dangerous would be arrested for a violent 
crime within the study period. The social scientist would treat all 
cases in which assertedly dangerous people had not been arrested as 
"false positives." Then he would cite the one-in-three ratio of "true" 
to "false" positives as proof that the psychologist could not accurately 
predict violent behavior. The one-in-three ratio, however, would have 
been the ratio that the psychologist had anticipated. Far from demon-
strating his inability to predict violent behavior, the empirical study 
would have vindicated his judgment. 
None of the studies commonly cited as demonstrating the inability 
of mental health professionals to predict violent behavior indicates 
that these professionals failed to predict violence with the degree of 
accuracy that they sought to attain. Similarly, the studies do not sug-
gest any inability to employ a higher level of confidence and thereby 
improve the professionals' "batting averages." 
To be sure, firm predictions of future violence probably cannot be 
made in large numbers of cases. Any policy of preventive detention 
163. H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA, supra note 151, at 33. 
164. Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, supra note 137, at 372. 
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likely to reduce the amount of crime substantially would be likely to 
require the detention of many people who would not commit crimes if 
released. This circumstance provides moral and economic reasons for 
rejecting widespread detention, but it offers no reason for rejecting de-
tention when predictions of future violence can be made with confi-
dence. Reducing violence a small amount is better than not reducing 
it at all. Perhaps, in practice, overzealous judges would fail to limit 
detention to sufficiently clear cases, but the objection that a power to 
detain would be expanded and misused is different from the objection 
that judges cannot accurately predict human behavior. 
No empirical study either supports or refutes this hypothesis, but I 
believe that I could go a dozen blocks from my office at the University 
of Chicago Law School, talk for a time with some young men standing 
on street corners, and ultimately identify a few whom I could predict 
with substantial confidence would commit serious crimes. If my belief 
is correct, perhaps these people should be imprisoned today - before 
they hit a helpless old man on the head and take his wallet or rob a 
dozen people and finally are caught. Cost-benefit analysis unre-
strained by respect for individual rights could justify much preventive 
imprisonment (including imprisonment based partly on racial and eth-
nic characteristics if these characteristics, joined with others, proved 
sufficiently predictive16s). 
Recognizing that my claim of predictive power is doubtful, how-
ever, I will not rely on it. I will instead invoke a less questionable 
power, one that I share with other law teachers - the power to ad-
vance the march of science with a wave of my hand. At my request, 
psychologists at Menninger University have improved their written in-
struments to the point that these tests now identify future violent of-
fenders with ninety-seven percent accuracy. 166 Preventive detention 
based solely on test scores implicates a substantial "liberty interest"; 
but it advances a compelling governmental interest and - thanks to 
the good work of the team at Menninger - does so with an extremely 
tight means-end fit. Whether the majority or the dissenting opinion in 
Schall v. Martin offered the better standard, my constitutional analysis 
is complete. Both my proposal to call in the police vans after inter-
165. Crime rates vary greatly among racial and ethnic groups, see, e.g., 1 REsEARCH ON 
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 90, table 2-2 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, s. Martin & M. 
Tonry eds. 1983), and although the prospect of imprisoning someone partly for being the wrong 
color is conscience-shocking, Schall has taught us that the prevention of crime is a "compelling" 
governmental interest. See 467 U.S. at 264. 
166. I have deliberately set the tests' accuracy at less than 100 percent. A perfect predictive 
power would call into question the assumption of free will that I believe underlies our legal 
system's rejection of "pure" schemes of preventive detention. See text at notes 176-206 infra. 
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viewing unemployed youths and my proposal for detention on the ba-
sis of test scores leave out nothing of constitutional significance, at 
least nothing of significance under interest-balancing standards. 
B. Other Broad Objections to Preventive Pretrial Detention 
Courts and commentators have opposed preventive pretrial deten-
tion on grounds other than the asserted impossibility of predicting 
human behavior. Some have maintained that the only historic func-
tion of detention before trial was to prevent flight, not to protect the 
community from crime.167 Indeed, in Stack v. Boyle, the Supreme 
Court declared that "[b ]ail set at a figure higher than an amount rea-
sonably calculated to [assure the presence of the accused at trial] is 
'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment."168 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court appears to have fashioned this limitation on the pur-
poses of pretrial detention without any historic basis. The historical 
record is all but silent on the issue. The available evidence offers no 
support for the common perception that pretrial detention in England 
and America lacked protective goals; indeed, a few sources indicate 
that this common perception is erroneous. 
For the most part, early commentators on the law of bail failed to 
address the issue. Although they insisted that the function of pretrial 
confinement was "custody" rather than "punishment,"169 they neither 
asserted nor denied that a purpose of this custody was to safeguard the 
community. In deciding whether to admit a defendant to bail, early 
justices of the peace considered the seriousness of the alleged offense 
and the strength of the preliminary evidence, 170 but the statutory crite-
ria that governed their decisions do not reveal whether crime preven-
tion was one goal of the system of pretrial restraints. The seriousness 
of the crime and the strength of the evidence might have mattered 
only because defendants threatened with severe punishment and likely 
to be convicted would be tempted to flee; but these considerations also 
might have mattered because people feared the presence in the com-
munity of defendants who, after a preliminary examination, seemed 
167. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1986) (New-
man, J.); State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 373, 164 A.2d 740, 743 (1960); Tribe, supra note 110, 
at 376-78; Hickey, Preventive Detention and the Crime of Being Dangerous, 58 GEO. L.J. 287, 
287-89 (1969). 
168. 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). 
169. See. e.g .• 2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CoNSUETUDINIBUS ANGLJAE 345 (S. Thorne 
trans. 1968); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *297, *300 (adding that "in this dubious in-
terval between the commitment and trial, a prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity, 
and neither be loaded with needless fetters, nor subjected to other hardships than such as are 
absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only"). 
170. See text at notes 190-95 infra. 
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guilty of serious crime.171 
Our forebears may indeed have regarded both justifications as per-
suasive; they may have seen no reason to choose between them or even 
to discuss the issue. Modem commentators who claim that the only 
legitimate function of detention before trial is the assurance of a de-
fendant's appearance apparently would release on bond or recogni-
zance even a frequently repeated offender arrested with a pistol and 
stolen cash moments after shooting and seriously wounding his victim 
- so long as this defendant had never missed a court appearance, had 
strong family and community ties, and had given no indication that he 
was likely to flee. To attribute this risk-taking to past generations, 
however, requires evidence that none of the commentators has 
presented. At most, the commentators have pointed to a murky his-
torical record and have cast the burden of disproof on others. As the 
commentators have observed, the available evidence does not clearly 
establish that pretrial detention had goals other than insuring the ap-
pearance of defendants at trial. Equally, however, this evidence does 
not establish that community protection was unimportant. Indeed, 
although the historical record is sparse, a few sources appeared to rec-
ognize that safeguarding the community from crime was an appropri-
ate function of pretrial restraint. 
Laurence Tribe, one of many scholars who have argued that the 
only goal of pretrial detention was to insure appearance at trial, of-
fered a piece of typically negative evidence: "The most comprehensive 
compilation of statutory and case law on the English bail system in the 
late eighteenth century nowhere suggests that fear of danger to the 
community before trial motivated the distinctions typically made be-
tween bailable and non-bailable offenses."172 Tribe apparently did not 
read closely enough. The source to which he referred, Highmore's 
Digest of the Doctrine of Bail, noted that, in criminal but not civil 
171. The issues considered by early justices of the peace included whether the defendant was 
a thief"openly defamed and known," whether he had been "taken with the manour," whether he 
had been charged on "light suspicion," and the like. See text at notes 192-93 infra. They did not 
include the sorts of considerations listed by the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 - the defen-
dant's "physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of 
residence in the community, community ties, ... history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, ... 
and record concerning appearance at court proceedings." See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (Supp. 
II 1984). An early justice of the peace might have been astonished by the suggestion that his 
preliminary examination should address not only the defendant's apparent guilt but also every 
other circumstance that might bear on the likelihood of his appearance at trial. If a defendant 
plainly had committed a serious crime, that was enough to justify his confinement. Perhaps the 
likelihood of flight was strong enough when a defendant seemed guilty of a serious crime (and 
weak enough in other cases) that further inquiry would have been superfluous, but protective 
goals offer at least as plausible an explanation of the shape of the early English law of bail. 
172. Tribe, supra note 110, at 40Q.01. 
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cases, English law had departed from the rule that had allowed bail 
universally. Highmore maintained that Parliament had departed from 
the common-law rule so "that the safety of the people should be pre-
served against the lawless depredations of atrocious offenders."173 
Moreover, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 provided: 
No man's person shall be restrained or imprisoned by any authority 
whatsoever, before the law hath sentenced him thereto, if he can put in 
sufficient security, bail, or maineprize for his appearance and good behav-
ior in the meantime, unless it be in crimes capital and contempts in open 
court and in such cases where some express act of [the legislature] doth 
allow it.174 
When bail would not insure a defendant's good behavior as well as his 
appearance, the Massachusetts colonists apparently considered deten-
tion appropriate. 
This limited evidence may not establish that community protection 
was a recognized goal of pretrial detention, but people who contend 
that our ancestors did not object to allowing murderers and highway-
men to roam among them should bear the burden of demonstrating 
this claim. If historical inquiry does not establish the illegitimacy of 
preventive pretrial detention, the current generation need not be bash-
ful about resolving this issue for itself. 
Some commentators also have objected to preventive pretrial de-
tention on the ground that every defendant must be presumed inno-
cent until a judge or jury has found him guilty.175 When innumerable 
witnesses have seen a defendant rob and shoot his victim, however, the 
presumption of innocence does not require a denial of the evidence of 
one's senses. The presumption is not a command to treat even the 
most obviously guilty defendant as innocent for all purposes until his 
guilt has formally been adjudicated. Instead, as the Supreme Court 
has recognized, the presumption is a rule of trial procedure; it requires 
a finder of fact to acquit a defendant when the government has failed 
173. A. HIGHMORE, A DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINE OF BAIL vii (1783). This treatise added: 
[F]ormerly bail was a general favour, granted to the subject in most cases; till it was found 
that increasing corruption growing more and more prevalent, and keeping pace with a rapid 
swell of population, and influx of inhabitants from other countries, it became necessary to 
institute some restrictions thereto; of which murder was the first - and surely no one can 
complain of this as an unjust innovation upon the generous liberality of our ancient law. 
Id. 
174. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES§ 18 (1641), reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS 
OF MASSACHUSETTS 37 (W. Whitmore ed. 1889) (emphasis added; spelling and punctuation 
modernized). 
175. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 110, at 404-05; Miller, Preventive Detention -A Guide to the 
Eradication of Individual Rights, 16 How. L.J. 1, 15-17 (1970); cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 
(1951) ("Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured 
only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning."). 
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to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.176 
IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL BAIL REFORM 
ACT OF 1984 
A. Things Passed By: Anglo-American History and the Freedom of 
the Human Will 
Sweeping constitutional objections to all forms of preventive pre-
trial incarceration seem unconvincing, and objections grounded on in-
terest-balancing approaches to the due process clause seem especially 
strained and artificial. Protecting the community from crime plainly 
qualifies as a "compelling" governmental interest; and in some cases at 
least, predictions of future criminality can be made with sufficient con-
fidence to establish a suitable "means-end match." 
Something that interest balancing leaves out, however, is a sense of 
history. The interests to be balanced are all here and now. In this 
respect, "utilitarian" views of the due process clause differ greatly 
from the "natural law" views that they have largely supplanted. 
Anglo-American history offers no condemnation of all preventive 
pretrial detention. From the very beginning, however, our law has 
resisted detention that lacks a predicate in past misconduct or a per-
son's inability to control his apparent dangerousness. Our ancestors 
manifested this resistance partly in their law of crimes. In 1883, Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen wrote, "Sinful thoughts and dispositions of 
mind ... were never punished in this country [even] by ecclesiastical 
criminal proceedings."177 Blackstone's familiar declaration that "to 
make a complete crime ... there must be both a will and an act"178 
expressed a fundamental principle, the refusal to punish or detain for 
dangerous propensities alone.119 Indeed, only one clear departure 
from this central principle - one unmistakable instance of "pure" 
preventive detention - comes to mind from nine centuries of Anglo-
American history. During World War II, Americans rationalized the 
incarceration of citizens of Japanese ancestry as an emergency war-
time measure.180 Despite the perceived threat to the nation's security, 
176. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). 
177. 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 78 (1883). 
178. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21. 
179. One statutory form of treason-compassing or imagining the death of the king-may 
have been an exception, but Blackstone reported that this compassing could not be punished 
until it bad been "demonstrated by some open or overt act." Noting that Dionysius bad report-
edly executed a subject for dreaming of his death, Blackstone declared, "[S]ucb is not the temper 
of the English law." Id. at *79. 
180. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court upheld the 
exclusion of Japanese-Americans from west coast "military areas" but failed to consider the 
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many Americans later came to view this action as a dark, shameful, 
and abberational moment in their history. 181 
An insistence on proof of past misconduct shaped the common 
law's rules of detention as well as its definitions of crime. 182 During 
constitutionality of their confinement in "assembly centers" and "relocation centers." Although 
the Court recognized that the "exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except 
under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental 
institutions," 323 U.S. at 220, it argued that the challenged exclusion bore "a definite and close 
relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage." 323 U.S. at 218. Three dissenting 
Justices would have considered and condemned the preventive incarceration as "a clear violation 
of Constitutional rights." 323 U.S. at 225 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy argued that 
"under our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights" and that "[t]o 
give constitutional sanction to [the inference drawn by the military authorities] is to adopt one of 
the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity of the individual." 323 
U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
181. See CoMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PER· 
SONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982); M. WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY (1976). 
Although the incarceration of Japanese-Americans during World War II may provide the 
only example of "pure" preventive detention in our history, the predicate of voluntary wrongdo-
ing supporting imprisonment for vagrancy and other crimes of status was weak. Moreover, the 
use of peace bonds subjected some assertedly dangerous people to a measure of preventive con-
trol. See Note, Peace and Behavior Bonds-Summary Punishment for Uncommitted Offenses, 52 
VA. L. REv. 914 (1966). As these examples suggest, the Anglo-American opposition to "predi· 
cate-less" preventive confinement has wavered. When compared to the willingness of govern· 
ments elsewhere to imprison likely troublemakers, however, nearly a millenium of English and 
American restraint remains truly remarkable. 
182. The discussion that follows emphasizes the rules governing the denial of bail rather than 
those governing detention following the admission of defendants to bail. It does so for two rea· 
sons. First, this branch of doctrine is the relevant branch in evaluating the Federal Bail Reform 
Act of 1984. Whether rightly or wrongly, Anglo-American law long has treated detention with· 
out bond as more restrictive ofliberty than detention with the (sometimes merely formal) option 
of posting bond. The Federal Bail Reform Act forbids detention because a defendant is unable to 
post bond and authorizes the detention of dangerous defendants without bond. See text at notes 
7-9 supra. It creates its regime of detention in the absence of safeguards that our history has 
demanded for centuries. Second, the early law governing the denial of bail provides a better 
indicator of how our legal system regarded pretrial imprisonment than the law governing the 
detention of defendants who fail to post bond. 
The English law of bail developed at a time when admitting a defendant to bail seems almost 
invariably to have led to his release. Indeed, for centuries, commentators spoke of the decision to 
admit a defendant to bail as though it were a decision to release him. Before releasing an untried 
defendant, a sheriff or justice of the peace required surety for his appearance. This requirement 
ordinarily was satisfied, however, when the defendant's family or friends pledged that he would 
appear. Bracton noted that strangers to the community and others who lacked friends could not 
gain pretrial release under this system of "pledges," but Bracton did not list people who lacked 
economic resources in the same category. "If the [accused] is a stranger and unknown, coming 
from afar, as a traveller, or if because of a lack of friends he cannot find pledges, let his pledge be 
the gaol, which is assigned for his custody and not for his punishment." 2 H. BRACTON, supra 
note 169, at 345. The Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 15 (1275), declared that defendants 
were to be bailed "without giving ought of their goods." 
The early surety system apparently rested on a series of related propositions. Because the 
sureties had assumed their obligations voluntarily, it would be appropriate to punish them llnan· 
cially if the defendant absconded. Because the defendant would not wish to bring this punish· 
ment on his sureties, he would hesitate to flee. And because the sureties would be concerned to 
avoid punishment, they would take effective steps to assure the defendant's appearance. The 
financial sanctions inflicted on sureties when defendants absconded were typically heavy, and the 
early surety system apparently achieved its objectives successfully. See generally E. DE HAAS, 
ANTIQUmES OF BAIL: ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES TO THE 
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the earliest days of the common law, when admitting a defendant to 
bail almost invariably meant his release,183 sheriffs had discretion to 
admit any criminal defendant to bail.184 Abuse of this power, how-
ever, both by "let[ting] out by replevin such as were not replevisable" 
and by "[keeping] in prison such as were replevisable,"185 led to a se-
ries of statutory restrictions. By the time of Bracton's treatise in the 
mid-thirteenth century, murder had become, for the sheriffs,186 a non-
bailable offense.187 In 1275, the Statute of Westminster I provided 
lists of situations in which sheriffs were required to release on bail and 
situations in which they were forbidden to do so.188 Stephen observed, 
"This statute was for 550 years the main foundation of the law of 
YEAR 1275 (1940); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 584-90 (2d 
ed. 1968). 
As an incident of this surety system, some defendants who had been admitted to bail were 
imprisoned, but their cases seemed aberrational. The authorities, moreover, appeared to view the 
detention of these defendants as more de facto than de jure. Their detention was an unavoidable 
incident of the useful practice of requiring surety for a released defendant's appearance. English 
authorities treated the law governing the admission of defendants to bail as, for all practical 
purposes, the law of pretrial restraint. 
High money bond ultimately resulted in the frequent detention even of defendants who had 
been admitted to bail, but when the extensive use of money bond began is unclear. The English 
Bill of Rights of 1689, the source of the provision of the United States Constitution that 
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required," complained that during the reign of James II judges had 
set high bail "to elude the benefitt of !awes made for the liberty of the subjects." The Bill of 
Rights, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Both the English Bill of 
Rights and the American apparently sought to ensure that decisions to admit defendants to bail 
would, once again, lead to release in all but exceptional cases. Nevertheless, the requirement that 
money bond be posted prior to release and the development of a commercial market in bail bonds 
made the later surety system a caricature of its ancestor. In recent decades, almost every Ameri-
can jurisdiction has moved away from this system to some degree by deemphasizing the use of 
monetary bond. 
183. See note 182 supra; E. DE HAAs, supra note 182, at 51-57. 
184. See 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *298 ("By the ancient common law, before 
and since the conquest, all felonies were bailable, till murder was excepted by statute."). 
185. Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 15 (1275). This statutory language suggests that 
by 1275 there were already categories of "replevisable" and "not replevisable" defendants; but 
immediately after this language, the statute declared, "[B]efore this time it was not determined 
which persons were replevisable, and which not [except for defendants charged with murder and 
a few other defendants]." The statute proceeded to remedy this defect by specifying which de-
fendants were to be bailed and which detained. See text at notes 192-93 infra. 
186. See text at note 190 infra. 
187. See 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 169, at 349 ("In every injuria and trespass against the 
king's peace to which the word 'felony' is added, the appellee or person accused is usually re-
leased by pledges, except in the case of homicide .... "). The unavailability of bail in homicide 
cases apparently led to temporary detention without bond in some assault cases as well: 
[T]he wound must ... be viewed, and ifit is a dangerous one and the appellee [the accused] 
is present let him be arrested at once and kept in custody until it is clear whether the 
wounded man can recover or not. lfhe cannot and dies, let the appellee be kept in prison; if 
he recovers, let the appellee be attached by four or more pledges, according as the wound is 
serious or slight; if it is mayhem, by many pledges, that there may be good security; if the 
wound is slight, two pledges are sufficient. 
Id. at 345. 
188. Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 15 (1275) (described in greater detail in text at 
notes 192-93 infra). 
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bail."I89 
Westminster I and the multitude of statutes that shaped the later 
English law of bail limited the discretion only of sheriffs and, later, of 
justices of the peace. High court judges retained an unquestioned 
power to release on sufficient surety any defendant, even one charged 
with murder or treason. I9o 
Decisions to admit defendants to bail or commit them to prison 
came to be made primarily by justices of the peace, and the law gov-
erning their decisions grew tangled and complex. Nevertheless, two 
general themes ran through this law. In the main, the justices were to 
order detention only when defendants were charged with very serious 
offenses and only when evidence of their guilt was clear. The justices 
were to conduct preliminary examinations of witnesses and defendants 
before granting or denying bail, and they were to record the evidence 
taken at these examinations so that judges of gaol delivery could re-
view the propriety of their decisions. I9I 
Bracton's treatise declared that, apart from murder cases (in which 
release was not allowed), "no one who can provide pledges is to be 
thrust into prison unless it is evident that he has perpetrated . . . a 
serious crime." Bracton added that sheriffs should consider not only 
"the nature and gravity of the crime" but also the accused's "distin-
guished rank and great wealth or his integrity or official position."I92 
Without departing from Bracton's principle, the Statute of Westmin-
ster I attempted to give it greater specificity. The statute established a 
right to bail when an accused had been charged with any crime "for 
which one ought not to lose life nor member." It also created a right 
to bail when a defendant had been charged with a serious crime on 
"light suspicion." At the same time, the statute forbade bail to 
"thieves openly defamed and known" and "such as be taken with the 
189. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 177, at 234. 
190. See, e.g., id. at 243; 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 129 
(1736). But cf Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (apparently endorsing the miscon· 
ception that English law treated some offenses as nonbailable altogether and declaring, "The 
Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail 
shall be allowed in this country"). 
191. See J. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GBR· 
MANY, FRANCE 5-15 (1974) (discussing the first Marian statute, An Act appointing an Order to 
Justices of the Peace for the Bailment of Prisoners, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., ch. 13 (1554-1555)). 
Langbein demonstrated that justices of the peace initially had no power to discharge defendants 
following their preliminary examinations and, further, that evidence gathered at their examina-
tions was to be used neither in securing indictments nor at trial. The sole function of the early 
preliminary examination was to inform the decision to release or detain defendants - then to 
permit review of this decision by judges of gaol delivery. Although a judge's review came too late 
to correct an erroneous decision to release or detain, it could lead to punishment of the erring (or 
corrupt) justice of the peace. 
192. 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 169, at 349-50. 
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manour" (caught red-handed). Similarly, it forbade bail to people 
who had formally confessed to felonies ("provers" and people who 
had "abjured the realm") and to defendants "not of good name" who 
had been implicated by admitted co-felons.193 
Throughout the centuries that followed, discussions of pretrial de-
tention emphasized the importance of preliminary proof of guilt. Ba-
con wrote, "In felony, bail may be admitted, where the fact is not 
notorious and the person not of evil fame." 194 Highmore declared, 
"[B]ail is regularly to be allowed in such cases wherein it seems doubt-
ful whether the person accused be guilty or not."195 
Some American colonies duplicated the patchwork English law of 
bail,196 but the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641 reformed and 
greatly simplified this law, reducing it to a single sentence.197 So did 
the Pennsylvania Frame of Government in 1682, the model for most 
subsequent enactments. The Pennsylvania formulation remained the 
basic provision of the American law of bail for three hundred years 
and is still the law of most states: "[A]ll prisoners shall be bailable by 
sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, where the proof is evi-
dent, or the presumption great."198 
This language entered federal law before the ratification of the 
Constitution. The Confederation Congress included the Pennsylvania 
formulation in its Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest 
193. Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 15 (1275). 
194. 7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 740 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath eds. 1870). 
Coke's treatise on bail, first published in 1635, suggested liberality in the award of bail: 
[A] man indicted or appealed of manslaughter may be bailed. 
A man indicted or appealed of rape, he may be bailed ..•. 
A man indicted for burglary may be bailed .... 
A man indicted or appealed of robbery may be bailed. 
A man indicted for putting out of eyes, cutting out of tongues, may be bailed. 
E. COKE, A TREATISE OF BAIL AND MAINPRIZE 21-22, in THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES 
OF THE LA ws OF ENGLAND (10th ed. 1703) (spelling modernized). Still, there were limits to this 
liberality: 
If a man commit felony, and be taken in the manner, he ought not to be bailed. 
If a man be indicted of manslaughter, robbery, rape, burglary, felony, or any other of-
fense whereof he is bailable; yet if he be an infamous and a notorious thief, and so openly 
and commonly esteemed and taken, bail may be denied him. 
Id. at 21. 
195. A. HIGHMORE, supra note 173, at 152 (emphasis omitted). 
196. See Foote, supra note 18, at 974 & n.75. 
197. MAssACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES § 18, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 174, at 37. The language of this provision appears in the text at 
note 174 supra. 
198. PENNSYLVANIA FRAME OF GOVERNMENT art. XI (1682), reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS 3052, 3061 (1909). 
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Territories in 1787.199 In the Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted one day 
before the submission of the Bill of Rights to the states, the First Con-
gress used different language but again recognized a right to bail in all 
noncapital cases. In determining whether to set bail in capital cases, 
the Act authorized judges to "exercise their discretion," admonishing 
them to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense, and of 
the evidence, and the usages of law."200 
Ultimately the constitutions of forty states adopted the Penn-
sylvania formulation.201 Moreover, most states that have recently 
amended their constitutions to permit detention without bond in non-
capital cases have departed from this format only slightly. Although 
these states have listed other serious offenses along with capital of-
fenses as crimes that may justify a denial of bail, they have retained a 
right to bail for less serious offenses. Moreover, they have permitted 
the denial of bail to defendants charged with capital and other serious 
crimes only when the proof is "evident" or the "presumption 
great. "202 
Both the English and the American law of pretrial detention took 
shape before imprisonment became a common penal sanction, at a 
time when capital offenses included all very serious crimes. The denial 
of bail to some defendants charged with noncapital offenses (now that 
the word capital no longer offers a shorthand description of all very 
serious offenses) does not seem to mark a major departure from histor-
ical principles. 203 
As this paper has suggested, sensible people usually do not allow 
murderers and highwaymen to roam among them.204 When people 
who appear to have committed very serious crimes cannot be tried 
immediately, self-protection can be reconciled with the principle that 
dangerousness is not a sufficient predicate for imprisonment in only 
one way. Before confining untried defendants, a judge must conclude 
199. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. II, 1 Stat. 51, S2 n.a. 
200. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. 
201. See State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 371, 164 A.2d 740, 742 (1960). 
202. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, 
§ 19; ILL. CoNST. art. I, § 9; MICH. CONST. art. I, § lS; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; UTAH CONST. 
art. I, § 8. 
203. Accord Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, SS VA. L. 
REV. 1223, 1225-31 (1969). Contra Miller, supra note 17S, at 15-16; Borman, The Selling of 
Preventive Detention 1970, 6S Nw. U. L. REv. 879, 901-03 (1971). 
204. Our forebears apparently did not do so when preliminary proof of guilt was clear, 
whatever their reasons for pretrial detention may have been. During the lengthy period when the 
most serious crimes were punishable by death, the denial of pretrial release usually was unequiv-
ocal; later this denial was commonly veiled in bail requirements that defendants could not meet. 
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 31, at 6; Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administra-
tion of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1038-43 (19S4). 
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on the basis of substantial preliminary proof that they are indeed mur-
derers and highwaymen. 
A society committed to the proposition that only deliberate wrong-
doing justifies imprisonment may permit even defendants charged with 
capital crimes to remain at large when the proof is not "evident" or 
the "presumption great." It may recognize that "bail is regularly to be 
allowed [when] it seems doubtful whether the person accused be guilty 
or not." Such a society may willingly tolerate greater risks than cost-
benefit analysis would support. When the proof does appear "evi-
dent," however, pretrial confinement no longer rests on dangerousness 
alone. It rests on the conclusion - based on imperfect evidence that 
is also the best available - that a defendant has abused his freedom by 
committing a serious crime. From the time of Bracton and the Statute 
of Westminster I and (even more clearly) from the time of the Penn-
sylvania Frame of Government in 1682 and the Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787, these sentiments have guided the Anglo-American law of pre-
trial restraint. 
Interest-balancing approaches to the due process clause not only 
leave out this history; they also leave out a central tenet of western 
culture that this history has expressed - a belief in the freedom of the 
human will. The traditional Anglo-American refusal to imprison until 
proof of past offending was "evident" revealed a conviction that indi-
vidual responsibility could be justified only by commensurate opportu-
nity. That every person was entitled to his liberty until he abused it 
was an unquestioned principle through the centuries. 
As Herbert Morris has observed, human beings have regarded 
themselves as capable of creating, among other things, themselves. 
Morris has noted "the inestimable value to each of us of having the 
responses of others to us determined over a wide range of our lives by 
what we choose rather than what they choose. A person has a right to 
institutions that respect his choices. "20s 
In at least a few cases, predictions of future wrongdoing can be 
made with confidence, and detention based on these predictions may 
further the "greater good." Nevertheless, even funnel clouds some-
times tum around, and human beings sometimes defy predictions. 
They tum around as well. Schemes of preventive detention that lack a 
predicate in past misconduct deny people the chance to tum around 
- the opportunity to choose. From the beginning, our history has 
treated this opportunity as an essential attribute of human dignity and 
as more than an interest to be weighed on a utilitarian scale. With 
205. Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 486 (1968). 
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only occasional aberrations, this history has condemned the incarcera-
tion of responsible adults until, in Blackstone's words, they have 
"abuse[d] ... that free-will which God has given to man."206 
B. Does Gerstein v. Pugh Remedy the Failure of the Federal Bail 
Reform Act to Require Proof of Past Misconduct? 
A constitutional decision of the Supreme Court provides a partial 
corrective for the Federal Bail Reform Act's failure to demand prelim-
inary proof of guilt. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 201 the Court held that "the 
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable 
cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following 
arrest."2os 
The Supreme Court was unanimous in this holding, but it divided 
five to four on other issues that the majority opinion addressed. The 
Gerstein majority, in statements that the four concurring Justices char-
acterized as dicta, declared that the required judicial determination of 
probable cause could be made ex parte and, further, that "[t]he stan-
dard [for imposing an extended pretrial restraint of liberty] is the same 
as that for arrest."209 In the majority's view, either the return of a 
grand jury indictment or the issuance of a warrant prior to arrest 
would satisfy the fourth amendment's requirements.210 Under Ger-
stein, a judge need not afford a defendant a hearing before imprisoning 
him and need find no greater likelihood of guilt than would be neces-
sary to justify his arrest. 
Most federal defendants receive no greater protection against un-
founded charges than Gerstein affords. The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provide adversary preliminary hearings only to defendants 
who are not indicted before or shortly after their arrests.211 In large 
federal districts in which grand juries are regularly in session, prelimi-
nary hearings are rare. Magistrates in the Southern District of New 
York, for example, conduct only about twenty-five of these hearings 
each year.212 Nationally, a reasonable guess is that only one federal 
defendant in nine obtains a preliminary hearing.213 
206. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *27. 
207. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
208. 420 U.S. at 114. 
209. 420 U.S. at 120. 
210. See 420 U.S. at 116 n.18, 117 n.19. 
211. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). 
212. See, e.g .• ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 29, at 512. 
213. This guess is based on the fact that during fiscal 1985 federal magistrates conducted 
44,379 initial appearances in criminal cases but only 4922 preliminary hearings. See id. 
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In the federal courts, the determination of probable cause usually 
is made by a grand jury. Grand jury proceedings are in camera; the 
rules of evidence do not apply; and the defendant has no right to ap-
pear or submit evidence.214 The only lawyer authorized to appear 
before the grand jury is the federal prosecutor, and a grand jury rarely 
fails to follow this official's recommendation to indict. The well-worn 
imagery may be exaggerated, but most observers regard grand juries as 
"rubber stamps" for prosecutors' offices.215 
In most cases, only the grand jury's determination of probable 
cause prevents the Federal Bail Reform Act from operating as a 
"pure" scheme of preventive detention. The 1984 Act affords a de-
fendant an adversary hearing on the issue of dangerousness. It guar-
antees him a right to counsel, a right to cross-examination, the 
assurance that adverse factual findings must be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence, and other safeguards.216 Neither the 1984 Act 
nor any other federal law guarantees the defendant a hearing on 
whether he has done anything wrong. The fourth amendment stan-
dard of probable cause, as the Supreme Court has interpreted it, de-
mands only a "fair probability" of guilt or a "substantial basis" for 
believing a defendant guilty.217 In short, under the 1984 Act, the prin-
ciple that proof of voluntary wrongdoing is necessary to deprive re-
sponsible adults of their liberty is respected only nominally. Even as 
supplemented by Gerstein, the Act authorizes imprisonment grounded 
almost entirely on a prediction of future misconduct. 
"Substantive" due process forbids some forms of involuntary, 
nonpunitive confinement. In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court 
ruled that "Indiana's indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant 
solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square 
with the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process."218 In 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Court noted that a state is forbidden to 
"incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccen-
tric."219 It held that "[a] finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot jus-
tify a State's locking a person up against his will and keeping him 
214. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63 (1956). 
215. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 589-90, 586 P.2d 916, 919, 150 
Cal. Rptr. 435, 438 (1978); M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION 
ON TRIAL 21-28 (1977). I once shared a podium with Richard Sprague, then the First Assistant 
District Attorney in Philadelphia. He summarized the role of the grand jury this way: "When 
we decide that we want an indictment, we say, 'Let's get an indictment.' It never occurs to us 
that we may not be able to get one." 
216. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. 
217. See text at notes 236-37 infra. 
218. 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972). 
219. 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
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indefinitely in simple custodial confinement."220 Both of these due 
process rulings were unanimous. 
"Substantive" due process similarly should preclude preventive 
confinement that lacks a predicate in past misconduct or an inability 
to control one's behavior. "Pure" preventive detention contravenes a 
"principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental."221 When the predicate for 
preventive confinement is voluntary wrongdoing, moreover, "proce-
dural" due process should require a demonstration of this wrongdoing 
by more than a finding of probable cause in an ex parte proceeding. 
The burdens that pretrial detention imposes on a defendant do not 
vary with the objectives that the detention is thought to serve. The 
government's restriction of a defendant's "liberty interest" is unaf-
fected by whether its goal is to punish him, prevent his commission of 
crime, or assure his appearance at trial. From an interest-balancing 
perspective that sees due process as "a flexible concept which requires 
different procedural protections for different degrees of intrusion on 
life, liberty or property interests,"222 Gerstein may appear to hold that 
an ex parte judicial determination of probable cause constitutes "the 
process that is due" before imprisoning a defendant under the 1984 
Act. 
This "functional" interpretation of Gerstein, however, would be 
plainly erroneous. Although incarceration to punish a defendant may 
impose the same burdens as incarceration to assure his appearance at 
trial, Gerstein did not hold that pretrial incarceration to achieve puni-
tive goals could be justified by an ex parte determination of probable 
cause. The Supreme Court did not abandon the principle that the only 
legitimate basis for criminal punishment under the Constitution is a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.223 Similarly, Gerstein did 
not hold that defendants could be imprisoned to protect the commu-
nity from crime simply because judges had found probable cause for 
their arrests. At the time that Gerstein was decided, the Supreme 
Court had indicated that the only purpose of pretrial restraint was to 
insure a defendant's appearance.224 Gerstein held no more than that 
220. 422 U.S. at 575. 
221. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
222. United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (quoted in text at note 68 supra). 
223. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) 
("[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of 
guilt in accordance with due process of law."). 
224. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). Federal statutory law expressed the same 
principle, see Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214, 214-15 
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probable cause provides an adequate predicate for detention when this 
detention is necessary to permit an adjudication of guilt or innocence 
to occur. 
In some criminal cases, danger to the community may justify pre-
trial detention to achieve protective goals. This interim incarceration 
may be "legitimate"; it may not require the same factual predicate that 
the Constitution requires for sanctions designed to stigmatize. Never-
theless, interim relief designed to incapacitate, to achieve one goal of 
criminal punishment, should be granted only on the basis of a substan-
tial showing that it will appear justified following a final adjudication. 
Gerstein v. Pugh did not address this "mixed" issue of substantive and 
procedural due process, an issue that is critical in judging the constitu-
tionality of the 1984 Act. 
Three developments subsequent to Gerstein, moreover, should 
prompt a reconsideration of that decision even as it applies to defen-
dants who pose a risk of flight if released.225 These developments are 
the enactment of the Bail Reform Act itself, the Supreme Court's re-
evaluation of the probable cause necessary to justify an arrest, and the 
Court's recognition that probable cause for arrest provides insufficient 
justification under the fourth amendment for deprivations of liberty 
more serious than arrest. 
1. Gerstein and the Bail Reform Act 
In the federal courts, the 1984 Act substituted an extensive regime 
of detention without bond for one in which detention without bond 
had been limited to capital cases. From a "functional" perspective, 
just as detention for punitive purposes may seem little different from 
detention for nonpunitive purposes, detaining a defendant without 
bond may seem little different from detaining him because he has been 
unable to post bond. A defendant who cannot post bond derives no 
comfort from the fact that a judge has afforded him the option of do-
ing so. 
Gerstein, however, was grounded on a historical rather than a 
functional analysis, and Anglo-American history has treated pretrial 
detention without bond as a more severe restriction of liberty than 
(repealed 1984), and so did some state judicial decisions. See, e.g., State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 
367, 372-73, 164 A.2d 740, 743 (1960); see also Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 
42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 67-69 (1977). 
225. Perhaps this argument should not be phrased in terms of a need to reconsider Gerstein; 
it might be cast instead in terms of the inapplicability of Gerstein to circumstances different from 
those that existed at the time of the Supreme Court's decision. However the argument should be 
characterized, the legal world has changed since Gerstein, and the justifications offered for that 
ruling no longer fit the circumstances. 
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detention for failure to post bond.226 At the time of the Gerstein deci-
sion, when most pretrial detention did follow the admission of defen-
dants to bail, the Supreme Court may have been justified in 
disregarding the historic rules governing the denial of bail. 227 These 
rules, however, make clear that history offers no warrant for the re-
gime of imprisonment created by the Federal Bail Reform Act. 
The Gerstein majority emphasized the historical basis of its deci-
sion when it responded to the more "functional" view of pretrial de-
tention asserted by the concurring Justices. These Justices thought it 
incongruous that the Court had afforded "less procedural protection 
to an imprisoned human being" than its due process decisions had 
required "to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial bank ac-
count, the custody of a refrigerator, the temporary suspension of a 
public school student, or the suspension of a driver's license."228 
Without denying this functional incongruity, the majority replied: 
The historical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different 
from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due process 
in debtor-creditor disputes and termination of government-created bene-
fits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal jus-
tice system, and its balance between individual and public interests 
always has been thought to define the "process that is due" for seizures 
of person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of sus-
pects pending trial. 229 
The historical analysis of Gerstein plainly does not extend to the 
sort of detention authorized by the Federal Bail Reform Act. The 
fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause has not defined the 
"process that is due" for the detention of suspects without bond. To 
the contrary, for three hundred years before the Bail Reform Act, 
American courts had permitted the denial of bail only when the proof 
226. See note 182 supra. 
227. See M. TOBORG, PRETRIAL RELEASE: A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF PRACTICES AND 
OUTCOMES 7 (National Evaluation Program Phase II Report Series B No. 2, 1981) ("Only a very 
small percentage of [detained] defendants were detained outright, with no possibility of release 
provided to them."). One of the plaintiffs in Gerstein had been denied bail, see 420 U.S. at 105, 
but the Court mentioned this fact only in passing without considering its historical or constitu-
tional significance. 
228. 420 U.S. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565 (1975); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)). 
229. 420 U.S. at 125 n.27. The majority also noted that "the Fourth Amendment probable 
cause determination is in fact only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, 
designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct." 420 U.S. at 125 (empha· 
sis in original). That a defendant will be afforded the benefits of "an elaborate system, unique in 
jurisprudence" after his pretrial incarceration has ended, however, has little bearing on the jus-
tice of the incarceration itself. Cf L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 88 (Harper & 
Bros. ed. 1902) (The king's messenger is "in prison now, being punished; and the trial doesn't 
even begin till next Wednesday; and of course the crime comes last of all."). 
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was "evident" or the "presumption great."230 Indeed, a substantial 
majority of American courts adhere to this rule today. Moreover, un-
til the Bail Reform Act, English and American courts consistently af-
forded defendants the opportunity to answer the charges against them 
before detaining them without bond.231 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 seems in fact to have restored much 
of the older law of bail, omitting only its principal safeguard. Under 
this Act, a federal judge determines whether a defendant will be de-
tained or released without masking this decision or turning it largely 
on wealth. The Act's return to the basic outline of the law of pretrial 
restraint during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance seems desirable. 
Only Congress' failure to insist on clear evidence of guilt as a prerequi-
site to detention marks a departure from the historic pattern. Unlike 
the law of pretrial restraint that had endured from the thirteenth cen-
tury, the 1984 Act imprisons without possibility of bail defendants 
whose past wrongdoing has not been demonstrated by substantial pre-
liminary proof. 
2. Gerstein and the Reevaluation of Probable Cause 
Gerstein v. Pugh declared, '~The standard for arrest is probable 
cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to war-
rant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or 
was committing an offense.' "232 Following Gerstein, however, in Illi-
nois v. Gates, 233 the Supreme Court overruled a series of decisions that 
had attempted to refine the probable cause concept. Noting that deci-
sions to search or arrest must be made in an "informal, often hurried 
context," the Court concluded that these decisions must rest on the 
"nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a stan-
dard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceed-
230. See text at note 198 supra. Some American courts held that the return of an indictment 
created a presumption that the proof was evident and cast the burden of rebutting this presump-
tion on the defendant. Even these courts, however, afforded the defendant a hearing on the issue. 
Most courts, moreover, rejected this narrow view of the historic requirement. They required 
prosecutors to present clear evidence of guilt as a prerequisite to detention without bond. See, 
e.g., State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 373-77, 164 A.2d 740, 743-45 (1960). 
231. From a modern perspective, the early preliminary examination that determined whether 
a defendant would be admitted to bail does not seem a model of adversary procedure. A justice 
of the peace examined the witnesses against the defendant in his absence, then interrogated the 
defendant himself. The defendant received no aid from counsel and no Miranda warnings, and 
the "inquisitorial" character of the proceedings ultimately led to protest and reform. See 1 J. 
STEPHEN, supra note 177, at 216-21. Even under what now may seem the crude procedures of a 
brutal age, however, a judge heard a defendant's side of the story before deciding whether to 
imprison him before trial without bond. 
232. 420 U.S. at 111 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). 
233. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
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ings."234 The Court added that "probable cause is a fluid concept ... 
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. "235 
Under Gates, probable cause to search requires only "a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place."236 The Court observed: "[S]o long as the magistrate had a 
'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover 
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no 
more."237 
Gates focused on the evidence necessary to justify a search. Trans-
posing its standards to the probable cause needed for arrest, one fed-
eral court of appeals has concluded that the fourth amendment,s 
requirement "is less than a rule of more-likely-than-not, but how 
much less depends on the circumstances."238 At least in some cases, 
this view seems appropriate. The Restatement (Second) of Torts pro-
vides a classic illustration: A police officer discovers two people exam-
ining a corpse, and each accuses the other of murder. The 
Restatement concludes that the officer is "privileged to arrest either or 
both."239 The propriety of arresting and detaining both suspects for a 
time so that law enforcement officers can investigate further does not 
suggest the legitimacy of holding both suspects for trial and detaining 
them for an extended period. 
As I have argued elsewhere, Gates sensibly abandoned the undue 
refinement of earlier probable cause decisions. In the context of the 
issue that the Supreme Court addressed, the case marked an appropri-
ate return to first principles. 240 Gates, however, did not consider the 
constitutional issues posed by lengthy pretrial detention. The Court's 
observations concerning the need to rely on the hurried judgments of 
lay people do not apply to judicial decisions to impose extended re-
straints on liberty prior to trial. The issues addressed by Gates had 
little in common with the issues addressed by Gerstein, and the combi-
234. 462 U.S. at 235-36. 
235. 462 U.S. at 232. 
236. 462 U.S. at 238. 
237. 462 U.S. at 236. 
238. Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.). But see 
Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227, 245-47 (1984) 
(arguing that "[o]n some occasions, a greater than fifty percent probability that a search will be 
successful may not ... justify it" while in other situations "a smaller than one percent chance" 
may be enough). 
239. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 119 comment j, illustration (1965). 
_240. See Alschuler, supra note 238, at 245-56 & n.98; Alschuler, "Close Enough for Govem-
ment Work'': The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 SUP. Cr. REV. 309, 325; see also Grano, 
Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 465 (1984). 
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nation of the two decisions yields outcomes that neither decision justi-
fied. The view of probable cause that the Supreme Court articulated in 
Gates accordingly should lead to a reevaluation of Gerstein's declara-
tion that "[t]he standard [for imposing an extended pretrial restraint 
of liberty] is the same as that for arrest."241 
3. Detention and Other Intrusions More Serious than Arrest 
Before Gerstein, the Supreme Court had recognized that probable 
cause is not a universal solvent for fourth amendment issues. The 
Court had said in Terry v. Ohio that when a law enforcement officer 
could "point to specific and articulable facts which . . . reasonably 
warrant [the] intrusion,''242 he could stop and detain a suspect briefly 
without probable cause. After Gerstein, the Court upheld a suspect's 
detention for twenty minutes in the absence of probable cause and ob-
served: "[O]ur cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry 
stops. . . . [W]e have emphasized the need to consider the law enforce-
ment purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably 
needed to effectuate those purposes."243 Were the Court to permit in-
trusions slightly less serious than arrest without probable cause and 
then to insist on no more than probable cause for intrusions much 
more serious than arrest, its rulings would not reflect a principled 
"balancing of the need for [a search or seizure] against the invasion of 
personal rights that [this intrusion] entails."244 The Court's sliding 
scale instead would slide in only one direction - toward upholding 
restrictio11s of liberty. 
Decisions subsequent to Gerstein have made clear that the Court 
does not take this unprincipled view. In Winston v. Lee, 245 the Court 
held that involuntary surgery to recover a bullet from a suspect re-
quired stronger justification than was provided by a showing of prob-
able cause. Similarly, Tennessee v. Garner246 held that a police 
officer's use of deadly force to effect a felony arrest violated the fourth 
amendment although this use of force was both necessary to prevent 
escape and supported by probable cause. Winston and Garner demon-
strated that Terry's coin does have two sides. They also cast Gerstein 
as an anomaly in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurispru-
dence - a glitch in the sliding scale. These recent cases and other 
241. 420 U.S. at 120 (1974). 
242. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
243. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). 
244. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
245. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
246. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
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developments since Gerstein have undercut the basis for that ruling as 
applied to detention under the 1984 Act. Neither a functional nor a 
historical analysis can support detention without bond simply on a 
showing of probable cause. 
Indeed, the constitutional standard for detention without bond 
should be no different from the standard for denying bail that has been 
part of our nation's jurisprudence from the beginning. This detention 
should be permissible only when "the proof is evident or the presump-
tion great." In more familiar, modernized language, this standard re-
quires "clear and convincing evidence" of guilt or convictability247 as 
a prerequisite to detention. 
C. An Analogy: Preventive Detention and Preliminary Injunctive 
Relief in Civil Cases 
In arguing for preventive detention legislation for the District of 
Columbia, Attorney General John Mitchell wrote, "A finding of prob-
able guilt of the offense charged is critical .... " 248 Mitchell observed 
that the standard incorporated in the legislation then proposed by the 
Justice Department - a substantial probability that the defendant 
committed the offense with which he is charged - "is perhaps best 
compared to the civil test for the issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion. "249 Mitchell's comparison seems instructive. Preventive pretrial 
detention affords the government interim relief in a criminal case. A 
party who seeks interim relief in a civil case, however, must establish 
both that he will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of this relief 
and that be probably will prevail on the merits.250 Requiring proof of 
danger to the community before granting pretrial relief in a criminal 
case may seem analogous to requiring proof of irreparable injury. The 
1984 Act, however, omits any analogue of the civil requirement of 
proof of probable success on the merits. Although the Senate 
Judiciary Committee considered the issue, it concluded that comply-
247. Although clear and convincing evidence of factual guilt would satisfy the due process 
clause, the better legislative standard would focus on convictability - the probability of the 
government's eventual success on the merits. To permit the detention of "factually guilty" de· 
fendants whose guilt cannot be demonstrated under evidentiary rules would undercut the policies 
those rules serve. Casting the requirement in terms of factual guilt might indeed invite deliberate 
abuse when prosecutors could not establish guilt in accordance with legal requirements. See note 
42 supra. Focusing on convictability would not require the application of evidentiary rules at the 
detention hearing itself; it would be enough for the government to demonstrate informally that it 
possessed sufficient admissible evidence to make conviction a strong probability. 
248. Mitchell, supra note 203, at 1238. 
249. Id. 
250. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 
§ 2948 (1973); Leubsdorf, The Standard/or Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526 
(1978). 
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ing with this standard would be too burdensome.251 
One might be troubled by Mitchell's analogy; treating an extended 
deprivation of liberty in the same manner as the issuance of a civil 
injunction apparently values liberty too little. To imprison defendants 
on the basis of substantially less evidence than would be required to 
justify interim relief in a civil case, however, is unconscionable.252 
251. See text at notes 40-42 supra. 
252. Perhaps courts could construe the Bail Reform Act in a way that would avoid its appar-
ent constitutional defect. The Act authorizes preventive detention when a case "involves" a 
crime of violence or another specified offense. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3146 (Supp. II 1984) (described 
more fully in text at notes 7-9 supra). Courts and commentators have assumed that a case in-
volves a crime of violence whenever the defendant is charged with a crime of violence, see, e.g., 
Serr, The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984: The First Wave of Case Law, 39 ARK. L. REv. 169, 
172 (1985), but "involves" is a verb for the 1980s. To say that a case "involves" a crime of 
violence is to say that the case has something to do with a crime of violence. Just what the case 
must have to do with a crime of violence before courts may order pretrial detention is an issue for 
these courts to resolve. Judges might in fact conclude that a case does not "involve" a crime of 
violence unless clear and convincing evidence suggests that a defendant has committed a crime of 
violence. 
Congress did not intend this construction of its statute. As noted, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee rejected a requirement that prosecutors establish a "substantial probability" of guilt as a 
prerequisite to imprisonment. See text at notes 40-42 supra. So long as Congress' language bears 
the suggested construction, however, the objection based on congressional intent might not be 
decisive. Congress might prefer a limiting construction of the statute to a declaration that the 
statute is unconstitutional. 
The suggested construction, however, might not save the 1984 Act. The Act authorizes im-
prisonment without bond not only when a case "involves" a crime of violence or other specified 
offense but also when the case "involves" a risk that the defendant will flee, intimidate a prospec-
tive witness or juror, or obstruct justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. II 1984). In these situa-
tions, the statutory language looks to the future rather than the past; importing a requirement of 
proof of past misconduct into this language seems impossible. Requiring a stronger factual basis 
for preventive detention than for detention designed to insure that a fair trial can occur may be 
justified, see text at notes 222-25 supra, but this article has suggested that the Constitution de-
mands a substantial predicate in past misconduct for this second form of detention as well. See 
text at notes 225-47 supra. Construing the Act to establish two classes of detained defendants -
one detained after adversary hearings at which prosecutors have offered clear and convincing 
evidence of guilt and one detained only on the basis of ex parte determinations of probable cause 
- would have a tenuous basis both in the language of the statute and in constitutional analysis. 
The Bail Reform Act also provides: 
The judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are conditions of release that will 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other per-
son and the community, take into account the available information concerning [among 
other things] ..• the weight of the evidence against the person. 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (Supp. II 1984). Although the Act declares that a judge or magistrate shall 
take this evidence into account, it does not indicate what weight he shall give it. A court might 
hold that a judge or magistrate should afford substantial weight to this consideration, refusing to 
order detention unless the preliminary evidence clearly indicates guilt. Again, however, Con-
gress' rejection of a requirement of preliminary proof of guilt reveals that it did not intend this 
construction; and treating one "factor to be considered" differently from all others would require 
a strained reading of the statute. 
Although courts might construe the Bail Reform Act to save its constitutionality, this con-
struction would require mighty judicial tugging. Congress could remedy the Act's constitutional 
defect without significant difficulty; and reluctant though courts should be to declare a major 
piece of federal legislation unconstitutional, they probably should hold the 1984 Act invalid. 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court might limit or overrule Gerstein v. Pugh, hold that the fourth 
amendment requires clear and convincing evidence of guilt as a prerequisite to extended pretrial 
detention without bond, and declare the Bail Reform Act constitutional when read in conjunc-
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CONCLUSION 
The failure of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 to demand 
proof of wrongdoing as a prerequisite to detention and its failure to 
afford hearings on this issue are incompatible with the law governing 
the award of interim relief in civil cases, with fourth amendment deci-
sions concerning intrusions more serious than arrest, with due process 
decisions governing the restraint of property, with Anglo-American 
tradition, with the current practice of most states, with the freedom 
that our culture customarily has afforded individuals to govern their 
lives, and with "fundamental fairness." The interest-balancing ap-
proach to due process that characterized both the majority and the 
dissenting opinions in Schall v. Martin leaped over most of these 
concerns. 
Hundreds or thousands of federal defendants are currently impris-
oned without bond although no judicial officer has found more than 
probable cause to believe them guilty of any wrongdoing. The require-
ment of probable cause nominally demands a "substantial basis'' for 
the belief that a person has committed an offense. The claim that any 
impartial authority has found even a "substantial basis," however, de-
pends on the fiction that grand juries exercise independent judgment. 
Most of today's detained defendants have not been afforded hearings 
on the issue of probable cause, and most will be detained for months 
before trial. 
These defendants are imprisoned in a nation that for centuries de-
manded that the proof be "evident" or the "presumption great" before 
denying bail even to defendants charged with capital crimes. Today's 
widespread imprisonment without trial occurs in a nation that once 
had heard whatever evidence defendants wished to present on guilt or 
innocence before determining whether to deny them bail. The incar-
ceration of defendants under the Bail Reform Act rests on a proposi-
tion that denies individual opportunity and affords little place to the 
freedom of the human will. This detention works an injustice that 
only a formulaic interest-balancing - one that sees freedom as 
subordinate to "compelling governmental interests" and misses most 
of what matters in human experience - could begin to obscure. This 
detention violates "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."253 
tion with this fourth amendment requirement. Such a ruling, however, would require the Court 
to address a number of constitutional objections to the 1984 Act that this article has not 
considered. 
253. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 
(1932); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). 
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Requiring substantial preliminary proof of guilt as a prerequisite to 
detention might not result in the release of many defendants currently 
detained under the 1984 Act. Federal prosecutors do not ordinarily 
file charges in the absence of evidence to support them, and they might 
be able to justify most current detention under the appropriate consti-
tutional standard. Nevertheless, whether a person is detained is not all 
that matters. Why this person is detained matters as well. The Fed-
eral Bail Reform Act takes at least a small step toward the preventive 
detention practices of those European dictators who Francis Allen 
suggested might have sparked the Supreme Court's initial use of the 
due process clause to control American criminal procedure. These 
dictators of the 1930s were not reluctant to subordinate human rights 
to compelling governmental interests. 
